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On the Impact of Forward Contract Obligations in Multi-Unit Auctions

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  • de Frutos, Maria-Angeles
  • Fabra, Natalia

Abstract

Several regulatory authorities worldwide have recently imposed forward contract obligations on electricity producers as a way to mitigate their market power. In this paper we investigate how such contractual obligations affect equilibrium bidding in electricity markets, or in any other auction-based market. For this purpose, we introduce forward contracts in a uniform-price multi-unit auction model with complete information. We find that forward contracts are pro-competitive when allocated to relatively large and efficient firms; however, they might be anti-competitive otherwise. We also show that an increase in contract volume need not always be welfare improving. From a methodological point of view, we aim at contributing to the literature on multi-unit auctions with discrete bids.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6756.

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Date of creation: Mar 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6756

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Related research

Keywords: antitrust remedies; discrete bids; electricity; Forward contracts; market power; multi-unit auctions; simulations;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Joseph Mullins & Liam Wagner & John Foster, 2010. "Price Spikes in Electricity Markets: A Strategic Perspective," Energy Economics and Management Group Working Papers 05, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
  2. Federico, Giulio & Lopez, Angel L., 2009. "Divesting power," IESE Research Papers D/812, IESE Business School.

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