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Default Service Auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Colin Loxley
  • David Salant

Abstract

In February 2002, New Jersey completed a market process whereby the utilities were able to purchase one-year forward contracts to ensure energy needs for their default service customers for a one-year period. The auction was the first application of the simultaneous descending clock auction to power procurement. We chose this auction format to fit the specific needs of the New Jersey Electric Discount and Energy Competition Act and the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities mandate for a competitive bidding process to procure the electricity to meet the electric utilities' default service obligations.

Suggested Citation

  • Colin Loxley & David Salant, 2004. "Default Service Auctions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 201-229, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:26:y:2004:i:2:p:201-229
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pickl, Matthias & Wirl, Franz, 2011. "Auction design for gas pipeline transportation capacity--The case of Nabucco and its open season," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 2143-2151, April.
    2. David P. Brown & Andrew Eckert, 2017. "Electricity market mergers with endogenous forward contracting," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 269-310, June.
    3. James Bushnell, 2007. "Oligopoly equilibria in electricity contract markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 225-245, December.
    4. repec:awi:wpaper:0460 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Moreno, R. & Barroso, L.A. & Rudnick, H. & Mocarquer, S. & Bezerra, B., 2010. "Auction approaches of long-term contracts to ensure generation investment in electricity markets: Lessons from the Brazilian and Chilean experiences," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(10), pages 5758-5769, October.
    6. Esplin, Ryan & Davis, Ben & Rai, Alan & Nelson, Tim, 2020. "The impacts of price regulation on price dispersion in Australia's retail electricity markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    7. Brown, David P. & Eckert, Andrew & Olmstead, Derek E.H., 2022. "Procurement auctions for regulated retail service contracts in restructured electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    8. Luiz T. A. Maurer & Luiz A. Barroso, 2011. "Electricity Auctions : An Overview of Efficient Practices," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 2346, December.
    9. Rey, Patrick & Salant, David, 2017. "Allocating essential inputs," TSE Working Papers 17-820, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jun 2019.
    10. Damianov, Damian S. & Oechssler, Jörg & Becker, Johannes Gerd, 2010. "Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply - experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 60-76, January.
    11. Fabra, Natalia & de Frutos, Maria-Angeles, 2008. "On the Impact of Forward Contract Obligations in Multi-Unit Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6756, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. salant, david j, 2010. "Sequential auction and auction design," MPRA Paper 30022, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Brown, David P. & Eckert, Andrew, 2018. "The effect of default rates on retail competition and pricing decisions of competitive retailers: The case of Alberta," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 298-311.
    14. Peña, Juan Ignacio & Rodriguez, Rosa, 2018. "Default supply auctions in electricity markets: Challenges and proposals," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 142-151.
    15. Yumi Oum & Shmuel S. Oren, 2010. "Optimal Static Hedging of Volumetric Risk in a Competitive Wholesale Electricity Market," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 7(1), pages 107-122, March.

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