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An Empirical Analysis Of The Impact Of Hedge Contracts On Bidding Behavior In A Competitive Electricity Market

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Author Info
FRANK A. WOLAK
Abstract

A major concern in the design of wholesale electricity markets is the potenial for the exercise of market power by generating unit owners. To better understand the determinants of generating unit owner market power and how it is exercised, this paper derives a model of bidding behavior in a competitive electricity market which incorporates various sources of uncertainty and the impact of the electricity generator's position in the financial hedge contract market on its expected profit-maximizing bidding behavior. The model is first used to characterize the profit-maximizing market price that a generator would like set by its bidding strategy for several hedge contract and spot sales combinations. This model is applied to bid and contract data obtained from the first three months of operation of the National Electricity Market (NEM1) in Australia. This analysis illustrates the sensitivity of expected profit-maximizing bidding strategies to the amount of financial hedge contracts held by the generating unit owner. It also provides strong evidence for the effectiveness of financial hedge contracts as a means to mitigate market power during the initial stages of operation of a wholesale electricity market. [L 94]

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Article provided by Korean International Economic Association in its journal International Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 14 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 1-39
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Handle: RePEc:taf:intecj:v:14:y:2000:i:2:p:1-39

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  1. Green, Richard, 1999. "The Electricity Contract Market in England and Wales," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(1), pages 107-24, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-77, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Green, Richard J & Newbery, David M, 1992. "Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 929-53, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Frank A. Wolak, 2007. "Quantifying the supply-side benefits from forward contracting in wholesale electricity markets," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(7), pages 1179-1209. [Downloadable!]
  2. Elizabeth Armington & Eric Emch & Ken Heyer, 2006. "The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2005–2006," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 305-326, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Joskow, Paul L & Tirole, Jean, 2007. "Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 6121, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Meredith Fowlie, 2008. "Incomplete Environmental Regulation, Imperfect Competition, and Emissions Leakage," NBER Working Papers 14421, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. James B. Bushnell & Erin T. Mansur & Celeste Saravia, 2007. "Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition An Analysis of Restructured U.S. Electricity Markets," NBER Working Papers 13507, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Valeria Termini & Laura Cavallo, 2007. "“Spot, Bilateral and Futures Trading in Electricity Markets. Implications for Stability”," Working Papers 2007.19, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  7. Laura Onofri, 2005. "Electricity Market Restructuring and Energy Contracts: A Critical Note on the EU Commission’s NEA Decision," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 71-85, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kai-Uwe Kühn & Matilde Machado, 2004. "Bilateral Market Power And Vertical Integration In The Spanish Electricity Spot Market," Working Papers wp2004_0414, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. MURPHY, Frederic & SMEERS, Yves, 2005. "Forward markets may not decrease market power when capacities are endogenous," CORE Discussion Papers 2005028, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  10. de Frutos, Maria-Angeles & Fabra, Natalia, 2008. "On the Impact of Forward Contract Obligations in Multi-Unit Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6756, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Soledad Arellano, 2004. "Market Power in Mixed Hydro-Thermal Electric," Documentos de Trabajo 187, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
  12. Le Coq, Chloé, 2003. "Long-Term Supply Contracts and Collusion in the Electricity Markets," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 552, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Termini Valeria & Cavallo Laura, 2003. "Electricity Derivatives and the Spot Market in Italy. Mitigating Market Power in the Electricity Market," Departmental Working Papers 190, Tor Vergata University, CEIS. [Downloadable!]
  14. Federico Boffa & Viswanath Pingali & Davide Vannoni, 2009. "Increasing Market Interconnection: An analysis of the Italian Electricity Spot Market," Working Papers 4, University of Torino, Department of Economics and Public Finance "G. Prato". [Downloadable!]
  15. Frank A. Wolak, 2003. "Measuring Unilateral Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets: The California Market, 1998–2000," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 425-430, May. [Downloadable!]
  16. James Bushnell, 2007. "Oligopoly equilibria in electricity contract markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 225-245, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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