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Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly

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Author Info
Matti Liski
Juan-Pablo Montero

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Abstract

We consider an infinitely-repeated oligopoly in which at each period firms not only serve the spot market by either competing in prices or quantities but also have the opportunity to trade forward contracts. Contrary to the pro-competitive results of finite-horizon models, we find that the possibility of forward trading allows firms to sustain collusive profits that otherwise would not be possible. The result holds both for price and quantity competition and follows because (collusive) contracting of future sales is more effective in deterring deviations from the collusive plan than in inducing the previously identified pro-competitive effects.

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File URL: http://tisiphone.mit.edu/RePEc/mee/wpaper/2004-012.pdf
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Paper provided by Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research in its series Working Papers with number 0412.

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Date of creation: May 2004
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Handle: RePEc:mee:wpaper:0412

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Paul Joskow, 2003. "Electricity Sector Restructuring and Competition: Lessons Learned," Cuadernos de Economía (Latin American Journal of Economics), Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 40(121), pages 548-558. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Abreu, Dilip, 1986. "Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 191-225, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Christopher R. Knittel & Victor Stango, 2003. "Price Ceilings as Focal Points for Tacit Collusion: Evidence from Credit Cards," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1703-1729, December. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Green, Richard, 1999. "The Electricity Contract Market in England and Wales," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(1), pages 107-24, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Juan Pablo Montero & Hugh Rudnick, 2002. "Second Generation Electricity Reforms in Latin America and the California Paradigm," Documentos de Trabajo 216, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
  7. Mahenc, P. & Salanie, F., 2004. "Softening competition through forward trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 282-293, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. David M. Newbery, 1998. "Competition, Contracts, and Entry in the Electricity Spot Market," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 726-749, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, 1984. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Business Cycles and Price Wars During Booms," NBER Working Papers 1412, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1984. "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 361-66, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Soledad Arellano, 2004. "Reformando el sector eléctrico chileno: Diga NO a la liberalización del mercado spot (Reforming the Chilean electricity sector: Just say NO to the Liberation of the spot market)," Documentos de Trabajo 197, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
  2. Matti Liski & Juan-Pablo Montero, 2008. "Forward Trading in Exhaustible-Resource Oligopoly," Working Papers 0806, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. James B. Bushnell & Erin T. Mansur & Celeste Saravia, 2007. "Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition An Analysis of Restructured U.S. Electricity Markets," NBER Working Papers 13507, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Juan Pablo Montero & Juan Ignacio Guzmán, 2005. "Welfare-Enhancing Collusion in the Presence of a Competitive Fringe," Documentos de Trabajo 298, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Mitraille, Sébastien & Moreaux, Michel, 2007. "Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Hierarchy in Two-Period Cournot Oligopoly," IDEI Working Papers 428, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Matti Liski & Juan Pablo Montero, 2008. "Market power in an exhaustible resource market: The case of storable pollution permits," Documentos de Trabajo 329, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
  7. José Luis Ferreira & Praveen Kujal & Stephen Rassenti, 2009. "The strategic motive to sell forward: experimental evidence," Economics Working Papers we092616, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  8. Veronika Grimm & Gregor Zoettl, 2006. "Access to Commitment Devices Reduces Investment Incentives in Oligopoly," Working Paper Series in Economics 25, University of Cologne, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Juan Pablo Montero, 2009. "Market Power in Pollution Permit Markets," Documentos de Trabajo 355, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
  10. Matti Liski & Juan Pablo Montero, 2005. "Market Power in a Storable-Good Market: Theory and Applications to Carbon and Sulfur Trading," Documentos de Trabajo 304, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
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  11. de Frutos, Maria-Angeles & Fabra, Natalia, 2008. "On the Impact of Forward Contract Obligations in Multi-Unit Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6756, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Matti Liski & Juan-Pablo Montero, 2006. "On Pollution Permit Banking and Market Power," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 283-302, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Baldursson , Fridrik M. & von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik, 2007. "Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts in Risky Markets," Memorandum 01/2007, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. James Bushnell, 2007. "Oligopoly equilibria in electricity contract markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 225-245, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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