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Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly

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Author Info
Liski, Matti
Montero, Juan-Pablo

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 131 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (November)
Pages: 212-230
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:131:y:2006:i:1:p:212-230

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. David M. Newbery, 1998. "Competition, Contracts, and Entry in the Electricity Spot Market," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 726-749, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Christopher R. Knittel & Victor Stango, 2003. "Price Ceilings as Focal Points for Tacit Collusion: Evidence from Credit Cards," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1703-1729, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Paul Joskow, 2003. "Electricity Sector Restructuring and Competition: Lessons Learned," Cuadernos de Economía (Latin American Journal of Economics), Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 40(121), pages 548-558. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Green, Richard, 1999. "The Electricity Contract Market in England and Wales," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(1), pages 107-24, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Juan Pablo Montero & Hugh Rudnick, 2002. "Second Generation Electricity Reforms in Latin America and the California Paradigm," Documentos de Trabajo 216, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
  7. Abreu, Dilip, 1986. "Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 191-225, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, 1984. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Business Cycles and Price Wars During Booms," NBER Working Papers 1412, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1984. "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 361-66, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Mahenc, P. & Salanie, F., 2004. "Softening competition through forward trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 282-293, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. José Luis Ferreira, 2006. "The Role of Observability in Futures Markets," Topics in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 6(1), pages 1266-1266. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Matti Liski & Juan Pablo Montero, 2008. "Market power in an exhaustible resource market: The case of storable pollution permits," Documentos de Trabajo 329, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
  3. Soledad Arellano, 2004. "Reformando el sector eléctrico chileno: Diga NO a la liberalización del mercado spot (Reforming the Chilean electricity sector: Just say NO to the Liberation of the spot market)," Documentos de Trabajo 197, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
  4. Veronika Grimm & Gregor Zoettl, 2006. "Access to Commitment Devices Reduces Investment Incentives in Oligopoly," Working Paper Series in Economics 25, University of Cologne, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Matti Liski & Juan Pablo Montero, 2005. "Market Power in a Storable-Good Market: Theory and Applications to Carbon and Sulfur Trading," Documentos de Trabajo 304, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Matti Liski & Juan-Pablo Montero, 2008. "Forward Trading in Exhaustible-Resource Oligopoly," Working Papers 0806, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. [Downloadable!]
  7. Juan-Pablo Montero & Juan Ignacio Guzmán, 2005. "Welfare-enhancing collusion in the presence of a competitive fringe," Working Papers 0511, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. [Downloadable!]
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  8. James B. Bushnell & Erin T. Mansur & Celeste Saravia, 2007. "Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition An Analysis of Restructured U.S. Electricity Markets," NBER Working Papers 13507, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. MITRAILLE, Sébastien & MOREAUX, Michel, 2007. "Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Hierarchy in Two-Period Cournot Oligopoly," IDEI Working Papers 428, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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