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Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination.

Volume (Year): 1 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 129-146
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Handle: RePEc:spr:jeicoo:v:1:y:2006:i:2:p:129-146

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Related research

Keywords: Auction design; Procurement auctions; Multi-unit auctions; Vickrey auctions; Uniform auctions; Discriminatory auctions; Computational experiments; Agent-based modelling; Multi-agent models; Learning; C900; D440; Q250;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

1. Swinkels, Jeroen M, 1999. "Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(3), pages 509-28, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996. "Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions," Discussion Papers 1173, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
2. Andreoni James & Miller John H., 1995. "Auctions with Artificial Adaptive Agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 39-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Nicolaisen, James & Petrov, Valentin & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 2001. "Market Power and Efficiency in a Computational Electricity Market with Discriminatory Double-Auction Pricing," Staff General Research Papers 1952, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Nicolaisen, James & Petrov, Valentin & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 2002. "Market Power and Efficiency in a Computational Electricity Market with Discriminatory Double-Auction Pricing," Staff General Research Papers 2050, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • James Nicolaisen & Valentin Petrov & Leigh Tesfatsion, 2000. "Market Power and Efficiency in a Computational Electricity Market with Discriminatory Double-Auction Pricing," Computational Economics 0004005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
4. Tesfatsion, Leigh, 2002. "Agent-Based Computational Economics: Growing Economies from the Bottom Up," Staff General Research Papers 5075, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
5. John A. List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2000. "Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 961-972, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Wilson, Robert, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
8. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F, 1993. "Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(4), pages 733-64. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Alsemgeest, Paul & Noussair, Charles & Olson, Mark, 1998. "Experimental Comparisons of Auctions under Single- and Multi-Unit Demand," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(1), pages 87-97, January.
   Other versions:
   • Alsemgeest, P. & Noussair, C. & Olson, M., 1995. "Experimental Comparisons of Auctions Under Single and Multi Unit Demand," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1078, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
10. Dirk Engelmann & Veronika Grimm, 2004. "Bidding Behavior In Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation And Some Theoretical Insights," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-12, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Dirk Engelmann & Veronika Grimm, 2003. "Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation and some Theoretical Insights," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp210, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague. [Downloadable!]

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