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Multi-unit auction format design

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  • Atakelty Hailu

    ()

  • Sophie Thoyer

    ()

Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11403-006-0012-9
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination.

Volume (Year): 1 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 129-146

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jeicoo:v:1:y:2006:i:2:p:129-146

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Web page: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/11403

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Related research

Keywords: Auction design; Procurement auctions; Multi-unit auctions; Vickrey auctions; Uniform auctions; Discriminatory auctions; Computational experiments; Agent-based modelling; Multi-agent models; Learning; C900; D440; Q250;

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References

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  1. Joshua M. Epstein & Robert L. Axtell, 1996. "Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262550253, January.
  2. David Lucking-Reiley & John A. List, 2000. "Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 961-972, September.
  3. Nicolaisen, James & Petrov, Valentin & Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 2001. "Market Power and Efficiency in a Computational Electricity Market with Discriminatory Double-Auction Pricing," Staff General Research Papers 2050, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  4. Alsemgeest, P. & Noussair, C. & Olson, M., 1995. "Experimental Comparisons of Auctions Under Single and Multi Unit Demand," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1078, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  5. Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996. "Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions," Discussion Papers 1173, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002.
  7. Dirk Engelmann & Veronika Grimm, 2003. "Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation and some Theoretical Insights," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp210, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  8. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Charles M. Kahn, 1998. "Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 227-258.
  9. Andreoni James & Miller John H., 1995. "Auctions with Artificial Adaptive Agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 39-64, July.
  10. Wilson, Robert, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-89, November.
  11. Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 2002. "Agent-Based Computational Economics: Growing Economies from the Bottom Up," Staff General Research Papers 5075, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  12. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F, 1993. "Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(4), pages 733-64.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Iftekhar, M.S. & Tisdell, J.G. & Connor, J.D., 2013. "Effects of competition on environmental water buyback auctions," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 59-73.
  2. Atakelty Hailu & Sophie Thoyer, 2010. "What Format for Multi-Unit Multiple-Bid Auctions?," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 35(3), pages 189-209, March.
  3. Markus Groth, 2009. "The transferability and performance of payment-by-results biodiversity conservation procurement auctions: empirical evidence from northernmost Germany," Working Paper Series in Economics 119, University of L√ľneburg, Institute of Economics.
  4. Laura Brown & Elizabeth Troutt & Cynthia Edwards & Brian Gray & Wanjing Hu, 2011. "A Uniform Price Auction for Conservation Easements in the Canadian Prairies," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(1), pages 49-60, September.

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