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Citations for "The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence"

by Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman

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  1. Waldman, Michael, 2013. "Classic promotion tournaments versus market-based tournaments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 198-210.
  2. Kahn, Lisa B. & Lange, Fabian, 2010. "Employer Learning, Productivity and the Earnings Distribution: Evidence from Performance Measures," IZA Discussion Papers 5054, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Lu�s Santos-Pinto, 2012. "Labor Market Signaling and Self-Confidence: Wage Compression and the Gender Pay Gap," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(4), pages 873 - 914.
  4. Kazuaki Okamura, 2011. "The Signalling Role of Promotion in Japan," Discussion Papers 1112, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
  5. Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2007. "Personnel Economics," NBER Working Papers 13480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Michael Waldman, 2012. "Theory and Evidence in Internal LaborMarkets
    [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]
    ," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
  7. Devereux, Paul J. & Hart, Robert A. & Roberts, J. Elizabeth, 2013. "Job Spells, Employer Spells, and Wage Returns to Tenure," IZA Discussion Papers 7384, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  8. Bognanno, Michael L. & Melero Martín, Eduardo, 2012. "Promotion Signals, Age and Education," IZA Discussion Papers 6431, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  9. Jin, Xin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Note Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 58484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Néria Rodréguez-Planas, 2011. "Displacement, Signaling, and Recall Expectations," Working Papers 550, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  11. Waldman, Michael & Zax, Ori, 2014. "An exploration of the promotion signaling distortion," MPRA Paper 60656, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Kurtulus, Fidan Ana & Tomaskovic-Devey, Donald, 2012. "Do Women Top Managers Help Women Advance? A Panel Study Using EEO-1 Records," IZA Discussion Papers 6444, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  13. Valerie Smeets & Michael Waldman & Frederic Warzynski, 2013. "Performance, Career Dynamics, and Span of Control," Economics Working Papers 2013-02, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  14. Kahn, Lisa B., 2013. "Asymmetric Information between Employers," IZA Discussion Papers 7147, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  15. Joshua C. Pinkston, 2006. "A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning With Testable Implications," Working Papers 390, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
  16. Fidan Ana Kurtulus & Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, 2011. "Do Women Top Managers Help Women Advance? A Panel Study Using EEO-1 Records," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2011-14, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
  17. DeVaro, Jed, 2011. "Using "opposing responses" and relative performance to distinguish empirically among alternative models of promotions," MPRA Paper 35175, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Gürtler, Marc & Gürtler, Oliver, 2013. "The optimality of heterogeneous tournaments," Working Papers IF42V1, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Institute of Finance.
  19. Jan Zabojnik, 2008. "Promotion Tournaments in Market Equilibrium," Working Papers 1193, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  20. Brösamle, Klaus J & Nordström Skans, Oskar, 2011. "Paths to higher office: evidence from the Swedish Civil Service," Working Paper Series, Center for Labor Studies 2011:17, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  21. Hannes Ullrich, 2014. "Leistungsanreize in Unternehmen," DIW Roundup: Politik im Fokus 32, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  22. Silva, António Dias da & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2006. "Wage Dynamics and Promotions Inside and Between Firms," IZA Discussion Papers 2351, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  23. Frederiksen, Anders & Lange, Fabian & Kriechel, Ben, 2012. "Subjective Performance Evaluations and Employee Careers," IZA Discussion Papers 6373, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  24. Prasad, Suraj & Tran, Hien, 2013. "Work practices, incentives for skills, and training," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 66-76.
  25. Kameshwari Shankar & Suman Ghosh, 2005. "Favorable Selection in the Labor Market: A Theory of Worker Mobility in R&D Intensive Industries," Working Papers 05006, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.
  26. Belzil, Christian & Bognanno, Michael & Poinas, François, 2012. "Promotion Determinants in Corporate Hierarchies: An Examination of Fast Tracks and Functional Area," TSE Working Papers 12-348, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  27. Xin Jin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Not Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 0314, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
  28. Jin, Xin, 2014. "Flattening Firms and Wage Distribution," MPRA Paper 58485, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  29. Nicholas Economides & Katja Seim & V. Brian Viard, 2007. "Quantifying the Benefits of Entry into Local Phone Service," Working Papers 07-28, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  30. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, 2010. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," NBER Working Papers 15977, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  31. Rider, Christopher I. & Thompson, Peter & Kacperczyk, Aleksandra & Tåg, Joacim, 2013. "Experience and Entrepreneurship," Working Paper Series 970, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  32. Xin Jin, 2014. "Flattening Firms and Wage Distribution," Working Papers 0414, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.