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Limited-Liability and Incentive Contracting with Multiple Projects

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Ulf Axelson & Per Strömberg & Michael S. Weisbach, 2009. "Why Are Buyouts Levered? The Financial Structure of Private Equity Funds," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(4), pages 1549-1582, August.
  2. Jonathan Conning, 2005. "Monitoring by Peers or by Delegates? Joint Liability Loans and Moral Hazard," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 407, Hunter College Department of Economics.
  3. repec:cgr:cgsser:01-04 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Conning, Jonathan & Udry, Christopher, 2007. "Rural Financial Markets in Developing Countries," Handbook of Agricultural Economics, in: Robert Evenson & Prabhu Pingali (ed.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 56, pages 2857-2908, Elsevier.
  5. Szydlowski, Martin, 2019. "Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
  6. Christian Espinosa & Juan Gorigoitía & Carlos Maquieira, 2012. "Nonlinear behaviour of EMBI index:the case of eastern European countries," Working Papers 37, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
  7. Xu Tan & Quan Wen, 2020. "Information acquisition and voting with heterogeneous experts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(4), pages 1063-1092, December.
  8. David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1823, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2012.
  9. Sonja Daltung & Vittoria Cerasi, 2006. "Financial structure, managerial compensation and monitoring," FMG Discussion Papers dp576, Financial Markets Group.
  10. Philippe Marcoul & Luc Veyssiere, 2010. "A Financial Contracting Approach to the Role of Supermarkets in Farmers' Credit Access," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1051-1064.
  11. Spiros Bougheas & Tianxi Wang, 2015. "Optimal Organization of Financial Intermediaries," Discussion Papers 2015/06, University of Nottingham, Centre for Finance, Credit and Macroeconomics (CFCM).
  12. Balmaceda, Felipe, 2016. "Optimal task assignments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 1-18.
  13. Jonathan Conning & Michael Kevane, 2002. "Why Isn't There More Financial Intermediation in Developing Countries?," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2002-28, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  14. Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2012. "Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 43(3), pages 442-474, September.
  15. Kragl, Jenny & Schöttner, Anja, 2011. "Wage Floors and Optimal Job Design," VfS Annual Conference 2011 (Frankfurt, Main): The Order of the World Economy - Lessons from the Crisis 48731, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  16. Josepa Miquel-Florensa, 2007. "Optimal Incentives in Dynamic Multiple Project Contracts," Working Papers 2007_2, York University, Department of Economics.
  17. Pei, Di, 2010. "Risk, limited liability and firm scope," MPRA Paper 27416, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Dec 2010.
  18. Peter-J. Jost & Frauke Lammers, 2010. "Organization of Project Evaluation and Implementation under Moral Hazard," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(2), pages 212-238, June.
  19. Kim, Doyoung & Lawarree, Jacques & Shin, Dongsoo, 2004. "Exit option in hierarchical agency," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(8-9), pages 1265-1287, November.
  20. Jenny Kragl & Anja Schöttner, 2014. "Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, And Optimal Job Design," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(2), pages 525-550, May.
  21. Richard Saouma, 2008. "Optimal Second-Stage Outsourcing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(6), pages 1147-1159, June.
  22. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 318-336, Summer.
  23. Tsai Tsung-Sheng & Kung Sheng-Chiao, 2011. "Sequential Investments, Know-How Transmission, and Optimal Organization," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-24, December.
  24. Felipe Balmaceda, 2012. "On the Optimality of One-size-fits-all Contracts: The Limited Liability Case," Documentos de Trabajo 291, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  25. Hoppe, Eva I. & Kusterer, David J., 2011. "Conflicting tasks and moral hazard: Theory and experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(8), pages 1094-1108.
  26. Pogach, Jonathan, 2018. "Short-termism of executive compensation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 150-170.
  27. Honda, Jun & Inderst, Roman, 2017. "Nonlinear Incentives and Advisor Bias," EconStor Preprints 253657, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
  28. Pierre Fleckinger & David Martimort & Nicolas Roux, 2024. "Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 1589-1646, December.
  29. Bougheas, Spiros & Wang, Tianxi, 2021. "A theory of outside equity: Financing multiple projects," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
  30. Dirk Bergemann & Tan Gan & Yingkai Li, 2023. "Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules," Papers 2310.10024, arXiv.org.
  31. Garrett, Daniel F. & Georgiadis, George & Smolin, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2023. "Optimal technology design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
  32. Leon Yang Chu & David E.M. Sappington, 2009. "Implementing high‐powered contracts to motivate intertemporal effort supply," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 296-316, June.
  33. Tamada, Yasunari & Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2007. "Optimal organization in a sequential investment problem with the principal's cancellation option," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 631-641, June.
  34. Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David, 2004. "The Organization of Delegated Expertise," IDEI Working Papers 284, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  35. Brett Green & Curtis R. Taylor, 2016. "Breakthroughs, Deadlines, and Self-Reported Progress: Contracting for Multistage Projects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(12), pages 3660-3699, December.
  36. Reinshagen, Felix, 2012. "Standards and Incentives under Moral Hazard with Limited Liability," Discussion Papers in Economics 12750, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  37. Bourjade, Sylvain & Schindele, Ibolya, 2011. "The role of agency costs in financial conglomeration," MPRA Paper 34815, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  38. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 315-329, October.
  39. Bond, Philip & Gomes, Armando, 2009. "Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 175-211, January.
  40. Flaxio Toxvaerd, 2005. "Mergers, Diversification and Financial Intermediation," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 43, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
  41. Fang, Dawei, 2019. "Dry powder and short fuses: Private equity funds in emerging markets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 48-71.
  42. Christian Laux, 2001. "Delegated Information Acquisition and Capital Budgeting: On the Separation of Project Evaluation and Project Management," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(4), pages 591-607, December.
  43. Desrieux, Claudine & Chong, Eshien & Saussier, Stéphane, 2013. "Putting all one's eggs in one basket: Relational contracts and the management of local public services," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 167-186.
  44. Chiesa, Gabriella, 2008. "Optimal credit risk transfer, monitored finance, and banks," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 464-477, October.
  45. Reinshagen, Felix, 2011. "Standards and Incentives in Safety Regulation," Munich Dissertations in Economics 13430, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  46. Cerasi, Vittoria & Daltung, Sonja, 2006. "Financial structure, managerial compensation and monitoring," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24634, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  47. Lu, Jingfeng & Shen, Bo & Wang, Zhewei, 2024. "Performance bundling in multi-dimensional competitions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
  48. Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David, 2007. "Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 271-299, November.
  49. Chen, Bo, 2012. "All-or-nothing payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 133-142.
  50. Ahlin, Christian, 2015. "The role of group size in group lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 140-155.
  51. Laux, Christian, 2008. "Corporate insurance design with multiple risks and moral hazard," CFS Working Paper Series 2008/54, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  52. Gottardi, Piero & Maurin, Vincent & Monnet, Cyril, 2025. "Fragility under joint financing: The (moral) hazards of diversification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 225(C).
  53. Dhritiman Gupta, 2023. "Prize sharing rules in collective contests: when do social norms matter?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(1), pages 221-244, February.
  54. Orlov, Dmitry, 2022. "Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
  55. Hartman-Glaser, Barney & Piskorski, Tomasz & Tchistyi, Alexei, 2012. "Optimal securitization with moral hazard," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 186-202.
  56. Bo Chen & Yu Chen & David Rietzke, 2017. "Simple Contracts under Observable and Hidden Actions," Graz Economics Papers 2017-07, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
  57. Joshua Ronen & Varda (Lewinstein) Yaari, 2007. "Demand for the truth in principal–agent relationships," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 125-153, March.
  58. Anna Maria C. Menichini & Peter Simmons, 2024. "Optimal Multiple Loan Contracting under Sequential Audits and Contagion Losses," CSEF Working Papers 742, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  59. Zemanek, Holger, 2004. "Investitions- und Finanzierungsverhalten Multinationaler Unternehmen," IWH Discussion Papers 197/2004, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
  60. Hamami, Tom, 2015. "Multiple tasks and political organization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 48-50.
  61. Balmaceda, Felipe & Balseiro, Santiago R. & Correa, José R. & Stier-Moses, Nicolás E., 2016. "Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 137-155.
  62. Kazumi Hori, 2014. "Contracting for Multiple Goods under Asymmetric Information: The Two-goods Case," KIER Working Papers 888, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  63. Xu, Minbo & Yin, Nina & Li, Sanxi, 2019. "Multitask assignments with adverse selection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 127-132.
  64. Lóránth, Gyöngyi & Morrison, Alan & Laux, Christian, 2016. "The Adverse Effect of Information on Governance and Leverage," CEPR Discussion Papers 11345, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  65. Demougin, Dominique & Helm, Carsten, 2023. "Overwhelmed by routine tasks: A multitasking principal agent perspective," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 216(C), pages 654-669.
  66. Hueth, Brent & Marcoul, Philippe, 2007. "The Cooperative Firm as Monitored Credit," Staff Papers 92122, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
  67. Baranchuk, Nina, 2008. "Organizing multiple related tasks into jobs: Diversification vs. competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 599-603, June.
  68. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Patrick Schmitz, 2008. "Task scheduling and moral hazard," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(2), pages 307-320, November.
  69. Brent Hueth & Philippe Marcoul, 2015. "Agents Monitoring Their Manager: A Hard‐Times Theory of Producer Cooperation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 92-109, March.
  70. Christian Laux & Gyöngyi Lóránth & Alan D. Morrison, 2018. "The Adverse Effect of Information on Governance and Leverage," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(4), pages 1510-1527, April.
  71. Maria De Paola & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2009. "Task assignment, incentives and technological factors," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(1), pages 43-55.
  72. Felipe Balmaceda, 2011. "Job Design and Incentives," Documentos de Trabajo 279, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  73. Li, Jin & Powell, Michael, 2020. "Multilateral interactions improve cooperation under random fluctuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 358-382.
  74. Bo Chen & Yu Chen & David Rietzke, 2020. "Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(4), pages 1023-1047, June.
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