Short-termism of executive compensation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen, 2015.
"CEO Preferences and Acquisitions,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 70(6), pages 2813-2852, December.
- Jenter, Dirk & Lewellen, Katharina, 2011. "CEO Preferences and Acquisitions," Research Papers 2089, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen, 2011. "CEO Preferences and Acquisitions," NBER Working Papers 17663, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen, 2011. "CEO Preferences and Acquisitions," CESifo Working Paper Series 3681, CESifo Group Munich.
- Anindya Banerjee & Alan Beggs, 1989. "Efficiency in Hierarchies: Implementing the First-Best Solution by Sequential Actions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(4), pages 637-645, Winter.
- Weisbach, Michael S., 1995. "CEO turnover and the firm's investment decisions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 159-188, February.
- Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March.
- Laux, Christian, 2001. "Limited-Liability and Incentive Contracting with Multiple Projects," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 514-526, Autumn.
- Eyal Winter, 2006. "Optimal incentives for sequential production processes," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(2), pages 376-390, June.
- Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 1995. "Long-Term Contracts, Short-Term Investment and Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 557-575.
- Giannetti, Mariassunta, 2011.
"Serial CEO incentives and the structure of managerial contracts,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 633-662, October.
- Giannetti, Mariassunta, 2007. "Serial CEO Incentives and the Structure of Managerial Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 6422, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- repec:oup:jleorg:v:33:y:2017:i:3:p:475-506. is not listed on IDEAS
- Froot, Kenneth A & Scharftstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1992.
" Herd on the Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a Market with Short-Term Speculation,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1461-1484, September.
- Kenneth A. Froot & David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, 1990. "Herd on the Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a Market with Short-Term Speculation," NBER Working Papers 3250, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dechow, Patricia M. & Sloan, Richard G., 1991. "Executive incentives and the horizon problem : An empirical investigation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 51-89, March.
- Palley, Thomas I., 1997. "Managerial turnover and the theory of short-termism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 547-557, April.
- Tamada, Yasunari & Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2007. "Optimal organization in a sequential investment problem with the principal's cancellation option," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 631-641, June.
- Bengt Holmstrom & Joan Ricart i Costa, 1986. "Managerial Incentives and Capital Management," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(4), pages 835-860.
More about this item
KeywordsExecutive compensation; Short-termism; Sequential production;
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:148:y:2018:i:c:p:150-170. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.