Stock Market Speculation and Managerial Myopia
This paper extends the analysis of managerial share price concerns by allowing informed trading in the stock market. It is shown that because they decrease the manager's information advantage vis-à-vis the stock market, individual investors who trade on private information improve the efficiency of corporate investment. This improvement does, however, fall short of first-best efficiency. Moreover, a stronger managerial share-price concern increases the expected profit from informed trading. Hence, by encouraging individual investors to collect information about corporate decisions and trade on it, managerial myopia tends to automatically bring forth a partial solution to the problems that it causes.
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Date of revision:||2004|
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