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Citations for "Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types"

by F. Forges & Frederic Koessler

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  1. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00753473 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Ingela Alger & Régis Renault, 2007. "Screening Ethics when Honest Agents Keep their Word," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(2), pages 291-311, February.
  3. Frédéric Koessler & Francoise Forges, 2008. "Long persuasion games," Post-Print hal-00360719, HAL.
  4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," Working Papers 1358, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  5. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," PSE Working Papers hal-00753473, HAL.
  6. Sher, Itai & Vohra, Rakesh, 2015. "Price discrimination through communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
  7. Hahn, Volker, 2011. "Sequential aggregation of verifiable information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1447-1454.
  8. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2016. "Disclosure and Choice," Discussion Paper Series dp694, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  9. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00586847 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Watson, Joel & Bull, Jesse, 2006. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt7973v805, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  11. Wagner, P.Achim, 2011. "Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 99-107, January.
  12. Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 305-314, May.
  13. Francoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," Post-Print hal-00360743, HAL.
  14. Aurélie Slechten, 2015. "Environmental agreements under asymmetric information," Working Papers 95042257, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
  15. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000725, David K. Levine.
  16. Ingela Alger & Régis Renault, 2006. "Screening Ethics When Honest Agents Care About Fairness ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(1), pages 59-85, 02.
  17. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(2), pages 403-419, April.
  18. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Lipman, Barton L., 2012. "Implementation with partial provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1689-1724.
  19. Hedlund, Jonas, 2015. "Persuasion with communication costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 28-40.
  20. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Barton L. Lipman, 2009. "Implementation and Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2009-002, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  21. Deneckere, Raymond & Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "Mechanism design with partial state verifiability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 487-513, November.
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