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Citations for "Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types"

by F. Forges & Frederic Koessler

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  1. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2007. "Hard evidence and mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 75-93, January.
  2. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Lipman, Barton L., 2012. "Implementation with partial provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1689-1724.
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000725, David K. Levine.
  4. FORGES, Françoise, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," CORE Discussion Papers 2006041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Frederic Koessler, 2006. "Lobbying with Two Audiences: Public vs Private Certification," THEMA Working Papers 2006-12, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  6. Sher, Itai & Vohra, Rakesh, 2015. "Price discrimination through communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
  7. Francoise Forges, 2006. "Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments," Post-Print hal-00360744, HAL.
  8. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000265, David K. Levine.
  9. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00753473 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Frédéric Koessler & Francoise Forges, 2008. "Long persuasion games," Post-Print hal-00360719, HAL.
  11. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, 05.
  12. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2016. "Disclosure and Choice," Discussion Paper Series dp694, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  13. Volker Hahn, 2010. "Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 10/136, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  14. Ingela Alger & Regis Renault, 2003. "Screening Ethics when Honest Agents Keep their Word," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 562, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 09 Nov 2004.
  15. Ingela Alger & Régis Renault, 2006. "Screening Ethics When Honest Agents Care About Fairness ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(1), pages 59-85, 02.
  16. Aurélie Slechten, 2015. "Environmental agreements under asymmetric information," Working Papers 95042257, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
  17. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00586847 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Deneckere, Raymond & Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "Mechanism design with partial state verifiability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 487-513, November.
  19. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Barton L. Lipman, 2009. "Implementation and Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2009-002, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  20. Wagner, P.Achim, 2011. "Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 99-107, January.
  21. Hedlund, Jonas, 2015. "Persuasion with communication costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 28-40.
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