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Citations for "Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types"

by F. Forges & Frederic Koessler

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  1. Ingela Alger & Régis Renault, 2006. "Screening Ethics When Honest Agents Care About Fairness ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(1), pages 59-85, 02.
  2. Francoise Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," THEMA Working Papers 2006-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  3. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2016. "Disclosure and Choice," Discussion Paper Series dp694, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  4. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2002. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt7715f08f, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  5. Wagner, P.Achim, 2011. "Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 99-107, January.
  6. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," Working Papers 1358, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  7. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01053478, HAL.
  8. Barton L. Lipman & Elchanan Ben-Porath, 2010. "Implementation with Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2010-018, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  9. Francoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," Post-Print hal-00360743, HAL.
  10. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000725, David K. Levine.
  11. Sher, Itai & Vohra, Rakesh, 2015. "Price discrimination through communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
  12. Frederic Koessler, 2006. "Lobbying with Two Audiences: Public vs Private Certification," THEMA Working Papers 2006-12, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  13. Hahn, Volker, 2011. "Sequential aggregation of verifiable information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1447-1454.
  14. Francoise Forges, 2006. "Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments," Post-Print hal-00360744, HAL.
  15. Ingela Alger & Régis Renault, 2007. "Screening Ethics when Honest Agents Keep their Word," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(2), pages 291-311, February.
  16. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00753473 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Hedlund, Jonas, 2015. "Persuasion with communication costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 28-40.
  18. Deneckere, Raymond & Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "Mechanism design with partial state verifiability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 487-513, November.
  19. Aurélie Slechten, 2015. "Environmental agreements under asymmetric information," Working Papers 95042257, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
  20. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Barton L. Lipman, 2009. "Implementation and Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2009-002, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  21. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00586847 is not listed on IDEAS
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