IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!)

Citations for "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring"

by Bhaskar, V. & Obara, Ichiro

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as
in new window


  1. Heller, Yuval, 2017. "Instability of belief-free equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 261-286.
  2. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2008. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 201-236, March.
  3. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-154, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  4. Michihiro Kandori, 2011. "Weakly Belief‐Free Equilibria in Repeated Games With Private Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(3), pages 877-892, May.
  5. Ichiro Obara, "undated". "The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case," Penn CARESS Working Papers ba7f35f1c50de4503e241d127, Penn Economics Department.
  6. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(3), pages 515-528, July.
  7. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2007. "The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 461-473, January.
  8. Josh Cherry & Lones Smith, 2009. "Unattainable Payoffs for Repeated Games of Private Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000284, David K. Levine.
  9. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(4), pages 475-493, November.
  10. Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 311-340, September.
  11. Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2002. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 189-228, January.
  12. Kandori, Michihiro, 2002. "Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 1-15, January.
  13. Lee, Gea M., 2010. "Optimal collusion with internal contracting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 646-669, March.
  14. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 823-852, May.
  15. Bhaskar, V & Mailath, George & Morris, Stephen, 2004. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma," Economics Discussion Papers 8873, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  16. Miyagawa, Eiichi & Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2008. "The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 192-221, March.
  17. McLean, Richard & Obara, Ichiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2014. "Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 191-212.
  18. Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul, 2006. "Private monitoring in auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 179-211, November.
  19. Ott, Ursula F., 2013. "International Business Research and Game Theory: Looking beyond the Prisoner's Dilemma," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 480-491.
  20. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2007. "Efficiency results in N player games with imperfect private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 382-413, July.
  21. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2007. "Finite State Equilibria in Dynamic Games," 2007 Meeting Papers 253, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  22. Johannes Horner & Olivier Gossner, 2007. "Private Monitoring without Conditional Independence," 2007 Meeting Papers 860, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  23. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2000. "Correlated Equilibrium and Private Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1265, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  24. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2012. "Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1998-2027.
  25. Obara, Ichiro, 2009. "Folk theorem with communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 120-134, January.
  26. Heller, Yuval, 2015. "Instability of Equilibria with Imperfect Private Monitoring," MPRA Paper 64468, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  27. Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2008. "Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations," MPRA Paper 37527, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Jan 2009.
  28. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 84-105, January.
  29. repec:esx:essedp:576 is not listed on IDEAS
  30. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  31. Chen, Bo, 2010. "A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 402-420, January.
  32. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2009. "A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 802-824, March.
  33. repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0015 is not listed on IDEAS
  34. Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-029, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 10 Feb 2011.
  35. Zhang, Wenzhang & Chan, Jimmy H., 2016. "Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
  36. Gossner, Olivier & Hörner, Johannes, 2010. "When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 63-84, January.
  37. Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2002. "Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 299-321, August.
  38. repec:pra:mprapa:64485 is not listed on IDEAS
  39. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  40. Jeffery Ely & Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2004. "Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit," Discussion Papers 1381, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  41. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2001. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-123, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  42. Fong, Kyna & Sannikov, Yuliy, 2007. "Efficiency in a Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8vz4q9tr, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  43. Olivier Gossner & Jöhannes Horner, 2006. "When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Discussion Papers 1440, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.