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Citations for "A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions"

by Plott, Charles R. & Levine, Michael E.

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  1. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 335-354, 09.
  2. Elinor Ostrom, 1986. "An agenda for the study of institutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 3-25, January.
  3. Randall Holcombe, 1989. "The median voter model in public choice theory," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 115-125, May.
  4. Kenneth Koford, 1982. "Optimal voting rules under uncertainty," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 149-165, January.
  5. Robert Inman, 1981. "On setting the agenda for Pennsylvania school finance reform: An exercise in giving policy advice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 449-474, January.
  6. David Reiley & John List, 2008. "Field experiments," Artefactual Field Experiments 00091, The Field Experiments Website.
  7. Fany Yuval, 2002. "Sophisticated Voting Under the Sequential Voting by Veto 1," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 343-369, December.
  8. Elizabeth Hoffman & Charles Plott, 1983. "Pre-meeting discussions and the possibility of coalition-breaking procedures in majority rule committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 21-39, January.
  9. Apesteguia, Jose & Ballester, Miguel A. & Masatlioglu, Yusufcan, 2014. "A foundation for strategic agenda voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 91-99.
  10. de Bartolome, Charles A.M., 1991. "Which Tax Rate Do People Use: Average or Marginal?," Working Papers 91-49, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  11. Kenneth Koford, 1982. "Centralized vote-trading," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 245-268, January.
  12. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
  13. Lang, Jrme & Xia, Lirong, 2009. "Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 304-324, May.
  14. Herne, Kaisa, 1997. "Decoy alternatives in policy choices: Asymmetric domination and compromise effects," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 575-589, September.
  15. Thomas Schwartz, 2008. "Parliamentary procedure: principal forms and political effects," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 353-377, September.
  16. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2014. "Empirical social choice: an introduction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 297-310, March.
  17. Carter, Richard, 1983. "Séparation, annexion, et fédéralisme : au-delà des préceptes normatifs usuels," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 59(3), pages 596-619, septembre.
  18. Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman, 1988. "Majority rule outcomes and the structure of debate in one-issue-at-a-time decision-making," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 239-252, December.
  19. Oleg Smirnov, 2009. "Endogenous choice of amendment agendas: types of voters and experimental evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 277-290, December.
  20. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2008:i:25:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Blais, André & Laslier, Jean-François & Sauger, Nicolas & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2009. "Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study," IDEI Working Papers 559, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  22. Robert Mackay & Carolyn Weaver, 1981. "Agenda control by budget maximizers in a multi-bureau setting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 447-472, January.
  23. Steven Johnson, 1984. "Demand-revealing processes and accounting standard-setting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 3-24, January.
  24. Daniel Zizzo, 2010. "Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 75-98, March.
  25. Messer, Kent D. & Poe, Gregory L. & Rondeau, Daniel & Schulze, William D. & Vossler, Christian A., 2006. "Anomalies In Voting: An Experimental Analysis Using A New, Demand Revealing (Random Price Voting) Mechanism," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21145, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  26. Luigi Marengo & Simona Settepanella, 2010. "Social choice among complex objects," LEM Papers Series 2010/02, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
  27. Conitzer, Vincent & Lang, Jérôme & Xia, Lirong, 2009. "How hard is it to Control Sequential Elections via the Agenda?," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/3899, Paris Dauphine University.
  28. Ortmann, Andreas, 2003. "Charles R. Plott's collected papers on the experimental foundations of economic and political science," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 555-575, August.
  29. Messer, Kent D. & Poe, Gregory L. & Rondeau, Daniel & Schulze, William D. & Vossler, Christian A., 2006. "Exploring Voting Anomalies Using a Demand Revealing Random Price Voting Mechanism," Working Papers 127062, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
  30. Meszerics, Tamás, 1997. "Stratégiai viselkedés és bizottsági döntés
    [Strategic behaviour and committee decison]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 687-697.
  31. Kenneth Koford, 1982. "Why so much stability? An optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 3-19, March.
  32. Charles Plott, 2014. "Public choice and the development of modern laboratory experimental methods in economics and political science," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 331-353, December.
  33. Marilyn Flowers, 1981. "Agenda control and budget size: An extension of the Romer-Rosenthal model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 579-584, January.
  34. Pam Brown, 1982. "Toward an informational dynamics of collective choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 415-420, January.
  35. Davis, James H. & Zarnoth, Paul & Hulbert, Lorne & Chen, Xiao-ping & Parks, Craig & Nam, Kidok, 1997. "The Committee Charge, Framing Interpersonal Agreement, and Consensus Models of Group Quantitative Judgment," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 137-157, November.
  36. Elizabeth Hoffman & Edward W. Packel, 1979. "A Theoretical Approach to the Decision to Stop Deliberating Over Legislative Alternatives," Discussion Papers 386, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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