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Citations for "Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies"

by Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite

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  1. George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2011. "Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1810, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. James W. Boudreau, 2008. "Sequential Pre-Marital Investment Games: Implications for Unemployment," Working papers 2008-45, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  3. George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Andrew Postlewaite, 2004. "Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(4), pages 617-633, December.
  4. Ed Hopkins, 2012. "Job Market Signaling Of Relative Position, Or Becker Married To Spence," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 290-322, 04.
  5. Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, 2001. "Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 414, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  6. Andrea, Canidio, 2010. "Absorptive capacity, the allocation of scientists, and firms' research productivity," MPRA Paper 30257, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Iyigun, Murat & Weiss, Yoram, 2006. "Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market," IZA Discussion Papers 2454, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  8. Ramya Sundaram, 2000. "Multiple Traits in the Marriage Market: Does Diversity Sometimes Win?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1666, Econometric Society.
  9. Jansen, Marcel, 2004. "Can Job Competition Prevent Hold-Ups?," IZA Discussion Papers 988, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  10. Navarro, Lucas, 2011. "Efficiency of two sided investments in an equilibrium unemployment framework," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 1090-1098, May.
  11. Moen, Espen R. & Rosén, Åsa, 2002. "Does poaching distort training?," Working Paper Series 4/2002, Swedish Institute for Social Research.
  12. Shingo Ishiguro, 2010. "Holdup, search, and inefficiency," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 307-338, August.
  13. George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2010. "Pricing in Matching Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000011, David K. Levine.
  14. Ximena Peña, . "Assortative Matching and the Education Gap," Borradores de Economia 427, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
  15. Bidner, Chris, 2010. "Pre-match investment with frictions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 23-34, January.
  16. Bester, Helmut, 2009. "Investments and the Holdup Problem in a Matching Market," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 263, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  17. Mailath,G.J. & Postlewait,A. & Samuelson,L., 2003. "Sunk investments lead to unpredictable prices," Working papers 11, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  18. Olivier Charlot & Bruno Decreuse, 2006. "Over-education for the rich vs under-education for the poor: a search-theoretic microfoundation," Working Papers halshs-00409583, HAL.
  19. Michael Peters & Aloysius Siow, 2002. "Competing Premarital Investments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 592-608, June.
  20. Nosaka, Hiromi, 2007. "Specialization and competition in marriage models," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 104-119, May.
  21. Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2003. "Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor," Departmental Working Papers 1, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
  22. Hoppe, Heidrun C. & Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2005. "The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 85, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  23. Sergei Severinov & Michael Peters, 2004. "Internet Trading Mechanisms And Rational Expectations," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 551, Econometric Society.
  24. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2003. "Optimal Design of Research Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 646-671, June.
  25. Coles, Melvyn & Francesconi, Marco, 2007. "On the Emergence of Toyboys: Equilibrium Matching with Ageing and Uncertain Careers," IZA Discussion Papers 2612, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  26. Conley, John P. & Neilson, William, 2009. "Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 761-774, July.
  27. Andrea, Canidio, 2009. "The production of science," MPRA Paper 25218, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  28. Charlot, Olivier & Decreuse, Bruno & Granier, Pierre, 2005. "Adaptability, productivity, and educational incentives in a matching model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 1007-1032, May.
  29. de Meza, David & Lockwood, Ben, 2010. "Too much investment? A problem of endogenous outside options," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 503-511, July.
  30. Yeon-Koo Che & Jozsef Sakovics, 2006. "The Hold-up Problem," ESE Discussion Papers 142, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  31. Francesca Flamini, 2002. "Dynamic Accumulation in Bargaining Games," Working Papers 2002_5, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.