IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/ces/ceswps/_3921.html

The Value of the Revolving Door: Political Appointees and the Stock Market

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Revolving Doors Matter
    by James Kwak in The Baseline Scenario on 2012-10-23 07:13:05

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Jiang, Jinglu & Goodarzi, Soheil & Kahai, Surinder & Cameron, Ann-Frances, 2025. "Navigating the technology-tide: Mitigating the impact of technology-related political risks on firm innovativeness through strategic diversification and board technology competency," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
  2. Benjamin Koch & Simon Luechinger & Christoph Moser, 2024. "Prediction Markets, the True Value of the Revolving Door and the US Cabinet," CESifo Working Paper Series 11557, CESifo.
  3. Berg, Helene, 2018. "Politicians’ Payments in a Proportional Party System," Research Papers in Economics 2018:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
  4. Shreekant Gupta & Bishwanath Goldar & Shubham Dang, 2019. "Environmental Performance And Capital Markets--Evidence From India," Working papers 303, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  5. Stefano DellaVigna & Ruben Durante & Brian Knight & Eliana La Ferrara, 2016. "Market-Based Lobbying: Evidence from Advertising Spending in Italy," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 224-256, January.
  6. Adam William Chalmers & Robyn Klingler‐Vidra & Alfio Puglisi & Lisa Remke, 2022. "In and out of revolving doors in European Union financial regulatory authorities," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 1233-1249, October.
  7. Griffith, Alan & Noonen, Thomas, 2021. "Does Public Campaign Funding Crowd Out Private Donation Activity? Evidence from Seattle's Democracy Voucher Program," SocArXiv 9wtzs, Center for Open Science.
  8. Elise S. Brezis & Joël Cariolle, 2017. "Financial Sector Regulation and the Revolving Door in US Commercial Banks," Studies in Political Economy, in: Norman Schofield & Gonzalo Caballero (ed.), State, Institutions and Democracy, pages 53-76, Springer.
  9. Grundke, Robert & Moser, Christoph, 2019. "Hidden protectionism? Evidence from non-tariff barriers to trade in the United States," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 143-157.
  10. José-Luis Peydró [AP BACKUP – NOW EXTERNAL] & Nicholas S. Coleman & Ozlem Akin & José-Luis Peydró & Christian Fons-Rosen, 2016. "Political Connections: Evidence From Insider Trading Around TARP," Working Papers 935, Barcelona School of Economics.
  11. Jeroen Klomp, 2022. "Shaping strategic arms trade controls: A multivariate approach," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(4), pages 646-671, November.
  12. Trevor Incerti, 2025. "How firms, bureaucrats, and ministries benefit from the revolving door: Evidence from Japan," Papers 2509.22173, arXiv.org.
  13. Matter, Ulrich & Roberti, Paolo & Slotwinski, Michaela, 2019. "Vote buying in the US Congress," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-052, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  14. Cesi Cruz & Benjamin A. T. Graham, 2022. "Social ties and the political participation of firms," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 117-142, January.
  15. Ozlem Akin & Nicholas S. Coleman & Christian Fons‐Rosen & José‐Luis Peydró, 2021. "Political connections and informed trading: Evidence from TARP," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 50(3), pages 619-644, September.
  16. Monica Martinez-Bravo & Leonard Wantchekon, 2021. "Political Economy and Structural Transformation: Democracy, Regulation and Public Investment," Working Papers wp2021_2110, CEMFI.
  17. Brezis, Elise S., 2017. "Legal conflicts of interest of the revolving door," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 175-188.
  18. Zhang, Min & Liu, Yaosong & Xie, Lu & Ye, Tingting, 2017. "Does the cutoff of “red capital” raise a red flag? Political connections and stock price crash risk," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 89-109.
  19. Berg, Heléne, 2020. "Politicians’ payments in a proportional party system," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
  20. Michelson, Noam, 2023. "The revolving door of former civil servants and firm value: A comprehensive approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
  21. Lavezzolo, Sebastián, 2020. "Political regimes and bank interest margins," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 44(2).
  22. Zhang, Karen & Truong, Cameron, 2019. "What’s the value of politically connected directors?," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3).
  23. Egerod, Benjamin C. K., 2019. "The Revolving Door and Regulatory Enforcement: Firm-Level Evidence on Tax Rates and IRS Audits," Working Papers 289, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
  24. Stéphane Benveniste & Renaud Coulomb & Marc Sangnier, 2022. "The (Market) Value of State Honors," AMSE Working Papers 2201, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
  25. Simon Luechinger & Mark Schelker & Lukas Schmid, 2025. "Do Firms Hire Politicians as Directors? Evidence from Close Elections," CESifo Working Paper Series 12019, CESifo.
  26. Restrepo-Ochoa, Diana Constanza & Peña, Juan Ignacio, 2020. "The impact of forced divestments on parent company stock prices: Buy on the rumor, sell on the news?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
  27. Haijie Huang & Edward Lee & Changjiang Lyu & Zhenmei (Judy) Zhu, 2024. "Does Firm‐level Political Uncertainty Affect the Mispricing of Earnings? A Natural Experiment through Government‐to‐business Revolving Door," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 60(3), pages 446-491, September.
  28. Roberti, Paolo, 2019. "Citizens or lobbies: Who controls policy?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 497-514.
  29. Luechinger, Simon & Moser, Christoph, 2020. "The European Commission and the revolving door," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
  30. Schmidt, Sebastian & Rose, Andrew K. & Fuchs, Andreas, 2021. "Is Davos More Than a Boondoggle?," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242460, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  31. repec:osf:socarx:9wtzs_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
  32. Braendle, Thomas, 2013. "Do Institutions Affect Citizens' Selection into Politics?," Working papers 2013/04, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
  33. Barbosa, Klenio & Straub, Stéphane, 2017. "The Value of Revolving Doors in Public Procurement," TSE Working Papers 17-873, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised May 2020.
  34. Elise S. Brezis & Joel Cariolle, 2014. "The Revolving Door Indicator: Estimating the Distortionary Power of the Revolving Door," Working Papers 2014-13, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
  35. Coulomb, Renaud & Sangnier, Marc, 2014. "The impact of political majorities on firm value: Do electoral promises or friendship connections matter?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 158-170.
  36. Pamela Campa & Lucija Muehlenbachs, 2024. "Addressing Environmental Justice through In-Kind Court Settlements," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 415-446, February.
  37. Lehrer, Nimrod David, 2018. "The value of political connections in a multiparty parliamentary democracy: Evidence from the 2015 elections in Israel," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 13-58.
  38. Griffith, Alan & Noonen, Thomas, 2022. "The effects of public campaign funding: Evidence from Seattle’s Democracy Voucher program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
  39. Brodmann, Jennifer & Unsal, Omer & Hassan, M. Kabir, 2019. "Political lobbying, insider trading, and CEO compensation," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 548-565.
  40. Klomp, Jeroen, 2023. "Political budget cycles in military expenditures: A meta-analysis," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 1083-1102.
  41. Elise S. Brezis, 2022. "Jewish Law and Ethics: The Case of the Revolving Door," Working Papers 2022-03, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
  42. Klomp, Jeroen, 2023. "Defending election victory by attacking company revenues: The impact of elections on the international defense industry," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
  43. Hadley, Brandy, 2019. "Executive compensation and political sensitivity: Evidence from government contractors," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 276-301.
  44. Fan Xia & Yunxin Hua & Bing Zhang, 2024. "Does non‐compliance pay? Environmental violations and share prices in China," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 31(3), pages 1886-1904, May.
  45. Heléne Berg, 2018. "Politicians' Payments in a Proportional Party System," CESifo Working Paper Series 7278, CESifo.
  46. Polk Andreas, 2020. "What do we Know About Lobbying in Germany?," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 71(1), pages 43-79, April.
  47. Cornaggia, Jess & Cornaggia, Kimberly J. & Xia, Han, 2016. "Revolving doors on Wall Street," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 400-419.
  48. Polk, Andreas, 2017. "Lobbyism in Germany: What do we know?," Beiträge zur Jahrestagung 2016 (Witten/Herdecke) 175190, Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Wirtschaftssysteme und Institutionenökonomik.
  49. Thomas Braendle & Alois Stutzer, 2017. "Voters and Representatives: How Should Representatives Be Selected?," CREMA Working Paper Series 2017-05, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  50. Wang, Yanbing & Delgado, Michael S. & Khanna, Neha & Bogan, Vicki L., 2019. "Good news for environmental self-regulation? Finding the right link," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 217-235.
  51. Asai, Kentaro & Kawai, Kei & Nakabayashi, Jun, 2021. "Regulatory capture in public procurement: Evidence from revolving door bureaucrats in Japan," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 328-343.
  52. Elise S. Brezis, 2023. "Regulating the Revolving Door of Regulators: Legal vs. Ethical Issues," Economies, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-13, December.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.