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Market-Based Lobbying: Evidence from Advertising Spending in Italy

Author

Listed:
  • Stefano DellaVigna
  • Ruben Durante
  • Brian Knight
  • Eliana La Ferrara

Abstract

We analyze a novel lobbying channel: firms shifting spending toward a politician's business in the hope of securing favorable regulation. We examine the evolution of advertising spending in Italy during 1993-2009, a period in which Berlusconi was in power three separate times, while maintaining control of Italy's major private television network, Mediaset. We document a significant pro-Mediaset bias in the allocation of advertising during Berlusconi's political tenure, especially for companies in more regulated sectors. We estimate that Mediaset profits increased by one billion euros during this period and that regulated firms anticipated sizeable returns, stressing the economic importance of this channel. (JEL D72, L51, L82, M31)

Suggested Citation

  • Stefano DellaVigna & Ruben Durante & Brian Knight & Eliana La Ferrara, 2016. "Market-Based Lobbying: Evidence from Advertising Spending in Italy," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 224-256, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:8:y:2016:i:1:p:224-56
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/app.20150042
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    Cited by:

    1. Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2020. "Empirical Models of Lobbying," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 12(1), pages 391-413, August.
    2. Long, Zhineng & Duan, Yulan & Zhan, Heng, 2024. "The impact of organizational-level political connection on environmental strategy in private firms," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    3. Canen, Nathan & Ch, Rafael & Wantchekon, Leonard, 2023. "Political uncertainty and the forms of state capture," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    4. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira & Allan Drazen, 2024. "A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(662), pages 2351-2390.
    5. Ulrich Matter & Paolo Roberti & Michaela Slotwinski, 2019. "Vote Buying in the US Congress," CESifo Working Paper Series 7841, CESifo.
    6. Lei, Zhenhuan & Nugent, Jeffrey B., 2018. "Coordinating China's economic growth strategy via its government-controlled association for private firms," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 1273-1293.
    7. Sugandha Srivastav & Ryan Rafaty, 2023. "Political Strategies to Overcome Climate Policy Obstructionism," Papers 2304.14960, arXiv.org.
    8. Rocco d`Este & Mirko Draca & Christian Fons-Rosen, 2020. "Shadow Lobbyists," Working Papers Series inetwp139, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
    9. Srivastav, Sugandha & Rafaty, Ryan, 2021. "Five Worlds of Political Strategy in the Climate Movement," INET Oxford Working Papers 2021-07, Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.
    10. Casarico, Alessandra & Tonin, Mirco, 2018. "Pay-What-You-Want to Support Independent Information: A Field Experiment on Motivation," IZA Discussion Papers 11366, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    11. Casarico, Alessandra & Tonin, Mirco, 2021. "A field experiment on fundraising to support independent information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 227-250.
    12. Shi, Ce Matthew & Li, Danhou, 2023. "The impact of broadband Internet on public media: Evidence from China," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    13. Leonardi, Marco & Mossucca, Rossella & Schivardi, Fabiano & Severgnini, Battista, 2021. "Gains from early support of a new political party," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 878-890.
    14. Jones, Sam & Schilling, Felix & Tarp, Finn, 2026. "Politicians doing business: Evidence from Mozambique," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
    15. Finn Tarp & Sam Jones & Felix Schilling, 2021. "Doing business while holding public office: Evidence from Mozambique’s firm registry," DERG working paper series 21-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Development Economics Research Group (DERG).
    16. Wei-Fong Pan, 2023. "Does a firm’s lobbying activity respond to its peers’ lobbying activity?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(3), pages 297-324, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
    • M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing

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