Jewish Law and Ethics: The Case of the Revolving Door
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Keywords
; ; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
- O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HME-2022-04-18 (Heterodox Microeconomics)
- NEP-HPE-2022-04-18 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2022-04-18 (Law and Economics)
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