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Communicating quality: a unified model of disclosure and signalling

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2008. "Privacy, Publicity, and Choice," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0809, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  2. Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2017. "Pricing an Experience Composite Good as Coordinated Signals," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 85(2), pages 163-182, March.
  3. Choné, Philippe & Linnemer, Laurent, 2010. "Optimal litigation strategies with observable case preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 271-288, November.
  4. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2010. "Public Goods, Social Pressure, and the Choice between Privacy and Publicity," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 191-221, May.
  5. Mingfeng Lin & Paulo Goes, 2012. "The Appeal of Third-party Certifications: Information Unraveling in Natural Experiments," Working Papers 12-02, NET Institute.
  6. Bikram Ghosh & Michael R. Galbreth, 2013. "The Impact of Consumer Attentiveness and Search Costs on Firm Quality Disclosure: A Competitive Analysis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(11), pages 2604-2621, November.
  7. Muxin Li & Ksenia Shakhgildyan, 2025. "``Frenemy'' of Two Giants: Amazon and Apple," Working Papers 25-06, NET Institute.
  8. Jean Marie Viaene & Laixun Zhao, 2009. "Tainted Food, Low-Quality Products and Trade," Discussion Paper Series 245, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
  9. Janssen, Maarten, 2017. "Regulating False Discloure," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168159, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  10. Simone Ghislandi & Michael Kuhn, 2016. "Asymmetric information in the regulation of the access to markets," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp219, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
  11. Yi‐Ling Cheng & Chris Y. Tung, 2025. "Signaling endogenous product quality with price in the presence of consumer boycotts," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 92(2), pages 403-433, October.
  12. Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2012. "Non-comparative versus comparative advertising of quality," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 352-360.
  13. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2014. "Do Actions Speak Louder than Words?," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 355, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  14. Philippe Mahenc, 2017. "Honest versus Misleading Certification," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 454-483, June.
  15. Leonard J. Mirman & Marc Santugini, 2011. "The Simple Analytics of Price Signaling Quality," Cahiers de recherche 11-04, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
  16. Catherine Gendron-Saulnier & Marc Santugini, 2013. "The Informational Benefit of Price Discrimination," Cahiers de recherche 13-02, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
  17. Eric Schmidbauer, 2013. "New and Improved?," Working Papers 2013-01, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  18. De Chiara, Alessandro & Elizalde, Idoia & Manna, Ester & Segura-Moreiras, Adrian, 2021. "Car accidents in the age of robots," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
  19. Bontems, Philippe & Mahenc, Philippe, 2014. "Signaling quality in vertical relationships," TSE Working Papers 14-467, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  20. P. Vanin, 2009. "Competition, Reputation and Cheating," Working Papers 683, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  21. Liang Guo, 2009. "Quality Disclosure Formats in a Distribution Channel," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(9), pages 1513-1526, September.
  22. Daher, Wassim & Mirman, Leonard J. & Santugini, Marc, 2012. "Information in Cournot: Signaling with incomplete control," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 361-370.
  23. Belleflamme, Paul & Peitz, Martin, 2014. "Asymmetric information and overinvestment in quality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 127-143.
  24. Yongmin Chen & Xinyu Hua, 2017. "Competition, Product Safety, and Product Liability," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 237-267.
  25. Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2008. "Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal," Diskussionsschriften dp0805, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  26. Andrew Rhodes & Chris M. Wilson, 2018. "False advertising," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(2), pages 348-369, June.
  27. Fuerst, Franz & Warren-Myers, Georgia, 2018. "Does voluntary disclosure create a green lemon problem? Energy-efficiency ratings and house prices," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 1-12.
  28. Buehler, Benno & Schuett, Florian, 2014. "Certification and minimum quality standards when some consumers are uninformed," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 493-511.
  29. Mahenc, Philippe, 2025. "Penetration or skimming pricing for credence products?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).
  30. Mirman, Leonard J. & Salgueiro, Egas M. & Santugini, Marc, 2014. "Noisy signaling in monopoly," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 504-511.
  31. Salvatore Piccolo & Piero Tedeschi & Giovanni Ursino, 2015. "How limiting deceptive practices harms consumers," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(3), pages 611-624, September.
  32. Levent Celik, 2014. "Information Unraveling Revisited: Disclosure of Horizontal Attributes," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(1), pages 113-136, March.
  33. Gibbons, Stephen & Neumayer, Eric & Perkins, Richard, 2015. "Student satisfaction, league tables and university applications: Evidence from Britain," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 148-164.
  34. Xinyu Li & Ronald Peeters, 2017. "Rivalry information acquisition and disclosure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 610-623, September.
  35. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2014. "Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? Auditing, Disclosure, and Verification in Organizations," Working Papers gueconwpa~14-14-04, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, revised 13 Jun 2015.
  36. Yiwen Bian & Shuai Yan & Zelong Yi & Xu Guan & Ying‐Ju Chen, 2022. "Quality Certification in Agricultural Supply Chains: Implications from Government Information Provision," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(4), pages 1456-1472, April.
  37. Jeremy Bertomeu & Davide Cianciaruso, 2018. "Verifiable disclosure," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(4), pages 1011-1044, June.
  38. Gibbons, Stephen & Neumayer, Eric & Perkins, Richard, 2013. "Student satisfaction, league tables and University applications," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58540, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  39. Liang Guo, 2020. "Upstream Exploitation and Strategic Disclosure," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(5), pages 923-938, September.
  40. Leonard J. Mirman & Marc Santugini, 2019. "The Informational Role of Prices," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(2), pages 606-629, April.
  41. Ganesh Iyer & Shubhranshu Singh, 2018. "Voluntary Product Safety Certification," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(2), pages 695-714, February.
  42. Stéphan Marette, 2007. "Minimum safety standard, consumers’ information and competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 259-285, December.
  43. Tingting Nian & Arun Sundararajan, 2022. "Social Media Marketing, Quality Signaling, and the Goldilocks Principle," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(2), pages 540-556, June.
  44. Hampton, Clark & Knutson, Macy & Masli, Adi & Stefaniak, Chad, 2025. "How negative accounting news events, voluntary ESG assurance, and assurance provider influence consumer purchasing intentions," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
  45. Denter, Philipp & Morgan, John & Sisak, Dana, 2011. ""Where Ignorance is Bliss, 'tis Folly to be Wise": Transparency in Contests," Economics Working Paper Series 1128, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
  46. Viaene, Jean-Marie & Zhao, Laixun, 2015. "Inspection, testing errors and trade in tainted products," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 99-116.
  47. Mark Bagnoli & Susan G. Watts, 2017. "Voluntary Assurance of Voluntary CSR Disclosure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(1), pages 205-230, February.
  48. Levent Celik, 2014. "A More General Framework to Analyze Whether Voluntary Disclosure is Insufficient or Excessive," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 44(2), pages 161-178, March.
  49. Anderlini, Luca & Gerardi, Dino & Lagunoff, Roger, 2016. "Auditing, disclosure, and verification in decentralized decision problems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 393-408.
  50. Xu Guan & Yuan Jiang & Yulan Wang, 2026. "Platform Certification and Seller Disclosure in Online Selling," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 28(2), pages 381-399, March.
  51. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2013. "Economic analysis of products liability: Theory," Chapters, in: Jennifer H. Arlen (ed.), Research Handbook on the Economics of Torts, chapter 3, pages 69-96, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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