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Car accidents in the age of robots

Author

Listed:
  • De Chiara, Alessandro
  • Elizalde, Idoia
  • Manna, Ester
  • Segura-Moreiras, Adrian

Abstract

In this paper, we compare liability rules in a world where human-driven and fully-autonomous cars coexist. We develop a model where a manufacturer can invest to improve the safety of autonomous cars. Human drivers may decide to purchase a fully-autonomous car to save precaution costs to avoid road accidents and shift liability to the car manufacturer. As compared to the negligence rule, a strict liability regime on both human drivers and car manufacturers is proved to be a superior policy. In particular, strict liability leads to more efficient R&D investments to enhance the benefits of the technology and favors the adoption of fully-autonomous cars. We also recommend that users of fully-autonomous cars make a technology-dependent payment to a third-party if there is an accident to discipline their activity levels.

Suggested Citation

  • De Chiara, Alessandro & Elizalde, Idoia & Manna, Ester & Segura-Moreiras, Adrian, 2021. "Car accidents in the age of robots," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:68:y:2021:i:c:s0144818821000466
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2021.106022
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytana, 2024. "Artificial intelligence, inattention and liability rules," Working Papers 2024-08, CRESE.
    2. Chopard, Bertrand & Musy, Olivier, 2023. "Market for artificial intelligence in health care and compensation for medical errors," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    3. Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytana, 2022. "Advisory algorithms and liability rules," Working Papers hal-04222291, HAL.
    4. Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytana, 2022. "Prediction, human decision and liability rules, CRED Working paper No 2022-06," Working Papers hal-04034871, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Autonomous vehicles; Investment problem; Liability rules; Torts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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