Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability
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More about this item
KeywordsApproval Regulation; Experimentation; Liability; Withdrawal;
- D18 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Protection
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
- M38 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Government Policy and Regulation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-LAW-2018-11-19 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2018-11-19 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2018-11-19 (Regulation)
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