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Dynamic Persuasion with Outside Information

Author

Listed:
  • Jacopo Bizzotto
  • Jesper Rüdiger
  • Adrien Vigier

Abstract

A principal seeks to persuade an agent to accept an offer of uncertain value before a deadline expires. The principal can generate information, but exerts no control over exogenous outside information. The combined effect of the deadline and outside information creates incentives for the principal to keep uncertainty high in the first periods so as to persuade the agent close to the deadline. We characterize the equilibrium, compare it to the single-player decision problem in which exogenous outside information is the agent's only source of information, and examine the welfare implications of our analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacopo Bizzotto & Jesper Rüdiger & Adrien Vigier, 2021. "Dynamic Persuasion with Outside Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 179-194, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:13:y:2021:i:1:p:179-94
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180141
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Wilfried Youmbi Fotso & Xun Chen, 2026. "Moral Hazard in Delegated Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2604.10006, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2026.
    2. Georgy Lukyanov & Samuel Safaryan, 2025. "Public Persuasion with Endogenous Fact-Checking," Papers 2508.19682, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2025.
    3. Chang Liu, 2021. "Motivating Effort with Information about Future Rewards," Papers 2110.05643, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2026.
    4. Escudé, Matteo & Sinander, Ludvig, 2023. "Slow persuasion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
      • Matteo Escud'e & Ludvig Sinander, 2019. "Slow persuasion," Papers 1903.09055, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
    5. Matysková, Ludmila & Montes, Alfonso, 2023. "Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    6. David Lagziel & Ehud Lehrer & Tao Wang, 2025. "Comparison of Oracles: Part II," Papers 2511.04449, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2025.
    7. Carroni, Elias & Ferrari, Luca & Pignataro, Giuseppe, 2025. "Does costly persuasion signal quality?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 103(PB).
    8. Can Urgun & Mark Whitmeyer, 2025. "Best Garbling is No Garbling: Persuasion in Real Time," Papers 2512.16850, arXiv.org.
    9. Li, Xuelin & Szydlowski, Martin & Yu, Fangyuan, 2025. "Dynamic information design in an entry game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    10. Szydlowski, Martin, 2024. "Fomenting conflict," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
    11. Kaya, Ayça, 2023. "Paying with information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.
    12. Emeric Henry & Marco Loseto & Marco Ottaviani, 2022. "Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5330-5347, July.
    13. Aïd, René & Bonesini, Ofelia & Callegaro, Giorgia & Campi, Luciano, 2025. "Continuous-time persuasion by filtering," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 127889, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    14. Lehrer, Ehud & Shaiderman, Dimitry, 2025. "Markovian persuasion with stochastic revelations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 411-439.
    15. Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Dima Shaiderman & Xianwen Shi, 2025. "Persuading while Learning," Working Papers tecipa-791, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    16. Nuta, Shunya, 2024. "Starting rough, Dynamic persuasion with partial information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
    17. Parakhonyak, Alexei & Vikander, Nick, 2023. "Information design through scarcity and social learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    18. Aïd, René & Bonesini, Ofelia & Callegaro, Giorgia & Campi, Luciano, 2025. "Continuous-time persuasion by filtering," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 176(C).
    19. Hyeonggyun Ko, 2025. "Persuasion in the Long Run: When history matters," Papers 2508.01662, arXiv.org.
    20. David Lagziel & Ehud Lehrer & Tao Wang, 2025. "Comparison of Oracles," Working Papers 2513, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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