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Best Garbling is No Garbling: Persuasion in Real Time

Author

Listed:
  • Can Urgun
  • Mark Whitmeyer

Abstract

We study continuous-time persuasion where a sender controls both how informative a signal is over time and when to stop providing information to a receiver. Given an exogenous signal process, the sender can both garble the evolving signal path and delay the receiver's decision at a convex, increasing cost of time. We show that, although both instruments are available, any optimal persuasion scheme is fully transparent: the sender keeps the signal fully informative and persuades solely by choosing when to stop.

Suggested Citation

  • Can Urgun & Mark Whitmeyer, 2025. "Best Garbling is No Garbling: Persuasion in Real Time," Papers 2512.16850, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2512.16850
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Emeric Henry & Gianmarco Ottaviano, 2019. "Research and the Approval Process: the Organization of Persuasion," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/1gr6n3t28b9, Sciences Po.
    2. Emeric Henry & Marco Loseto & Marco Ottaviani, 2022. "Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5330-5347, July.
    3. Emeric Henry & Marco Ottaviani, 2019. "Research and the Approval Process: The Organization of Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(3), pages 911-955, March.
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    8. C'esar Barilla, 2025. "When and what to learn in a changing world," Papers 2510.17757, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2025.
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    10. Li, Xuelin & Szydlowski, Martin & Yu, Fangyuan, 2025. "Dynamic information design in an entry game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
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    13. Yingni Guo & Eran Shmaya, 2019. "The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(2), pages 653-675, March.
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