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Bayesian Persuasion with Selective Disclosure

Author

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  • Yifan Dai
  • Drew Fudenberg
  • Harry Pei

Abstract

A sender first publicly commits to an experiment and then can privately run additional experiments and selectively disclose their outcomes to a receiver. The sender has private information about the maximal number of additional experiments they can perform (i.e., their type). We show that the sender cannot attain their commitment payoff in any equilibrium if (i) the receiver is sufficiently uncertain about their type and (ii) the sender could benefit from selective disclosure after conducting their full-commitment optimal experiment. Otherwise, there can be equilibria where the sender obtains their commitment payoff.

Suggested Citation

  • Yifan Dai & Drew Fudenberg & Harry Pei, 2026. "Bayesian Persuasion with Selective Disclosure," Papers 2601.05914, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2601.05914
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2601.05914
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