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Merger policy in digital industries

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  • Cabral, Luís

Abstract

I present a cautionary note on the proposal to tighten merger policy in the high-tech space. The discouragement effect on innovation could be significant. This is not to say that increased policy enforcement is not called for. On the contrary. My point is that it should primarily take the form of checking for abuses of dominant position, tightening consumer protection, and directly regulating dominant firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Cabral, Luís, 2021. "Merger policy in digital industries," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:54:y:2021:i:c:s0167624519302537
    DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100866
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Gilbert, Richard J. & Katz, Michael L., 2022. "Dynamic merger policy and pre-merger product choice by an entrant," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    3. Zelda Brutti & Luis E. Rojas, 2022. "M&A and early investment decisions by digital platforms," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 49(3), pages 509-543, September.
    4. Christopher Teh & Dyuti Banerjee & Chengsi Wang, 2022. "Acquisition-induced kill zone," Monash Economics Working Papers 2022-24, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    5. Zhijun Chen & Chongwoo Choe & Jiajia Cong & Noriaki Matsushima, 2022. "Data‐driven mergers and personalization," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(1), pages 3-31, March.
    6. Prado, Tiago S., 2022. "Safeguarding Competition in Digital Markets: A Comparative Analysis of Emerging Policy and Regulatory Regimes," 31st European Regional ITS Conference, Gothenburg 2022: Reining in Digital Platforms? Challenging monopolies, promoting competition and developing regulatory regimes 265666, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    7. Prado, Tiago S. & Bauer, Johannes M., 2022. "Big Tech platform acquisitions of start-ups and venture capital funding for innovation," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    8. Bisceglia, Michele & Padilla, Jorge & Piccolo, Salvatore & Shekhar, Shiva, 2022. "Vertical integration, innovation and foreclosure with competing ecosystems," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    9. Klaus Gugler & Florian Szücs & Ulrich Wohak, 2023. "Start-up Acquisitions, Venture Capital and Innovation: A Comparative Study of Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp340, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
    10. Rabbani, Maysam, 2021. "Mergers with Future Rivals Can Boost Prices, Intensify Market Concentration, and Bar Entry," MPRA Paper 112864, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Apr 2022.
    11. Mansour Naser Alraja & Faris Alshubiri & Basel M. Khashab & Mahmood Shah, 2023. "The financial access, ICT trade balance and dark and bright sides of digitalization nexus in OECD countries," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 13(2), pages 177-209, June.
    12. Prado, Tiago S., 2021. "Kill Zones? Effects of Big Tech Start-up Acquisitions on Innovation," 23rd ITS Biennial Conference, Online Conference / Gothenburg 2021. Digital societies and industrial transformations: Policies, markets, and technologies in a post-Covid world 238049, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    13. Steffen, Nico & Wiewiorra, Lukas & Kroon, Peter, 2021. "Wettbewerb und Regulierung in der Plattform- und Datenökonomie," WIK Discussion Papers 481, WIK Wissenschaftliches Institut für Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste GmbH.
    14. Esmée Dijk & José Luis Moraga-González & Evgenia Motchenkova, 2023. "Start-up Acquisitions and the Entrant’s and Incumbent’s Innovation Portfolios," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 23-047/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    15. Rabbani, Maysam, 2023. "Mergers with future rivals can boost prices, bar entry, and intensify market concentration," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).

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    merger policy; digital industries;

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