IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/13115.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Standing on the Shoulders of Dwarfs: Dominant Firms and Innovation Incentives

Author

Listed:
  • Cabral, Luis

Abstract

We develop a dynamic innovation model with three important features: (a) asymmetry between large and small firms ("giants" and "dwarfs"); (b) technology transfer by acquisition; and (c) the distinction between radical innovation (compete for the market) and incremental innovation (compete within the market). We provide conditions such that (a) greater asymmetry between giant and dwarfs decreases incremental innovation but increases radical innovation; and (b) allowing for technology transfer increases incremental innovation but decreases radical innovation. These results have several policy implications, including: (a) with weak markets for technology, a soft antitrust policy toward dominant firms leads to an increase in radical innovation but a decrease in incremental innovation; (b) a merger policy that restricts the acquisition of fringe firms by dominant firms leads to lower incremental innovation rates and higher radical innovation rates; (c) the effect of IP protection on innovation is mixed: by increasing the prize from patenting, it increases incremental innovation; but, by improving the market for technology, it reduces the rate of radical innovation.

Suggested Citation

  • Cabral, Luis, 2018. "Standing on the Shoulders of Dwarfs: Dominant Firms and Innovation Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 13115, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13115
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP13115
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ronald L. Goettler & Brett R. Gordon, 2011. "Does AMD Spur Intel to Innovate More?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(6), pages 1141-1200.
    2. Martin Watzinger & Thomas A. Fackler & Markus Nagler & Monika Schnitzer, 2020. "How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 328-359, November.
    3. Joshua S. Gans & David H. Hsu & Scott Stern, 2002. "When Does Start-Up Innovation Spur the Gale of Creative Destruction?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 571-586, Winter.
    4. Christopher Budd & Christopher Harris & John Vickers, 1993. "A Model of the Evolution of Duopoly: Does the Asymmetry between Firms Tend to Increase or Decrease?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(3), pages 543-573.
    5. Suzanne Scotchmer, 1991. "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 29-41, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Xavier Boutin, 2015. "Mergers and the Dynamics of Innovation," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2015-15, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    2. Gambardella, Alfonso & Giuri, Paola & Luzzi, Alessandra, 2007. "The market for patents in Europe," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 1163-1183, October.
    3. Anna Rita Bennato & Laura Magazzini, 2009. "International Cooperation in Pharmaceutical Research," Working Papers 62/2009, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    4. Bhaven Sampat & Heidi L. Williams, 2019. "How Do Patents Affect Follow-On Innovation? Evidence from the Human Genome," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(1), pages 203-236, January.
    5. Schwiebacher, Franz, 2012. "Complementary assets, patent thickets and hold-up threats: Do transaction costs undermine investments in innovation?," ZEW Discussion Papers 12-015, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    6. Gaessler, Fabian & Harhoff, Dietmar & Sorg, Stefan, 2019. "Bargaining Failure and Freedom to Operate: Re-evaluating the Effect of Patents on Cumulative Innovation," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 220, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    7. Ron N. Borkovsky, 2017. "The timing of version releases: A dynamic duopoly model," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 187-239, September.
    8. Joerg Baten & Nicola Bianchi & Petra Moser, 2015. "Does Compulsory Licensing Discourage Invention? Evidence From German Patents After WWI," NBER Working Papers 21442, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Schwiebacher, Franz, 2013. "Does fragmented or heterogeneous IP ownership stifle investments in innovation?," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-096, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    10. Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, 2008. "Intellectual property rights and efficient firm organization," Economics Working Papers 1254, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised May 2014.
    11. Iain M. Cockburn & Megan J. MacGarvie & Elisabeth Müller, 2010. "Patent thickets, licensing and innovative performance," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 19(3), pages 899-925, June.
    12. Encaoua, David & Guellec, Dominique & Martinez, Catalina, 2006. "Patent systems for encouraging innovation: Lessons from economic analysis," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(9), pages 1423-1440, November.
    13. Mueller, Elisabeth & Cockburn, Iain M. & MacGarvie, Megan, 2013. "Access to intellectual property for innovation: Evidence on problems and coping strategies from German firms," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 529-541.
    14. Elizabeth Webster & Paul H. Jensen, 2011. "Do Patents Matter for Commercialization?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(2), pages 431-453.
    15. Lee, Jong-Seon & Park, Ji-Hoon & Bae, Zong-Tae, 2017. "The effects of licensing-in on innovative performance in different technological regimes," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 485-496.
    16. Paola Giuri & Myriam Mariani & Stefano Brusoni & Gustavo Crespi & Dominique Francoz & Alfonso Gambardella & Walter Garcia-Fontes & Aldo Geuna & Raul Gonzales & Dietmar Harhoff & Karin Hoisl & Christia, 2005. "Everything you Always Wanted to Know about Inventors (but Never Asked): Evidence from the PatVal-EU Survey," LEM Papers Series 2005/20, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
    17. Giuri, Paola & Mariani, Myriam, 2007. "Inventors and invention processes in Europe: Results from the PatVal-EU survey," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 1105-1106, October.
    18. Cabral, Luís, 2021. "Merger policy in digital industries," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    19. Arora, Ashish & Gambardella, Alfonso, 2010. "The Market for Technology," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, in: Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 641-678, Elsevier.
    20. Narajabad, Borghan & Watson, Randal, 2011. "The dynamics of innovation and horizontal differentiation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 825-842, June.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13115. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.