IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/reecde/v29y2025i2d10.1007_s10058-024-00365-x.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The more the merrier? Disciplinary actions against malpractice

Author

Listed:
  • Limor Hatsor

    (Jerusalem College of Technology)

  • Artyom Jelnov

    (Ariel University)

Abstract

In a world of experience goods, two costly ex-post disciplinary actions can be used against malpractice of firms: consumer lawsuits and government investigation. We distinguish between government effectiveness in detecting ‘bad behavior’ vs. ‘good behavior’ of firms—both play a key role in the model. Our results suggest that while an effective government eliminates malpractice completely, the intervention of an ineffective government may backfire, failing to protect the product safety. The reason is that on top of its ineffectiveness, the government may deter consumers from pursuing lawsuits (crowding-out), augmenting the malpractice of firms compared to an equilibrium without government intervention. Additionally, an improvement in government ability to detect ‘bad behavior’ should be complemented by a reduction of lawsuit cost or an improvement in the ability to detect ‘good behavior’ in order to restore consumer incentive to pursue lawsuits.

Suggested Citation

  • Limor Hatsor & Artyom Jelnov, 2025. "The more the merrier? Disciplinary actions against malpractice," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 29(2), pages 313-333, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:29:y:2025:i:2:d:10.1007_s10058-024-00365-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00365-x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10058-024-00365-x
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10058-024-00365-x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Experience goods; Product safety; Malpractice; Tort law; Government inspection; Government effectiveness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:29:y:2025:i:2:d:10.1007_s10058-024-00365-x. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.