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Citations for "Constrained School Choice"

by Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn

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  1. Caterina Calsamiglia & Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn, 2010. "Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1860-1874, September.
  2. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 80-106, February.
  3. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2013. "Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 237-239.
  4. Kojima, Fuhito, 2013. "Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 1-14.
  5. Dwenger, Nadja & Kübler, Dorothea & Weizsäcker, Georg, 2014. "Flipping a coin: Theory and evidence," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2013-201r, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  6. Carrillo, Juan D & Singhal, Saurabh, 2011. "Tiered Housing Allocation: an Experimental Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 8255, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Min Zhu, 2013. "College Admissions in China : A Mechanism Design Perspective," Working Papers 1327, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
  8. Wu, Binzhen & Zhong, Xiaohan, 2014. "Matching mechanisms and matching quality: Evidence from a top university in China," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 196-215.
  9. Nikhil Agarwal & Paulo Somaini, 2014. "Demand Analysis using Strategic Reports: An application to a school choice mechanism," NBER Working Papers 20775, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Paula Jaramillo & Ça?atay Kay? & Flip Klijn, 2017. "School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms," Working Papers 957, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  11. Flip Klijn & Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz, 2013. "Preference intensities and risk aversion in school choice: a laboratory experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(1), pages 1-22, March.
  12. Min Zhu, 2013. "College Admissions in China : A Mechanism Design Perspective," Working Papers halshs-00860931, HAL.
  13. Takashi Akahoshi, 2014. "A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(3), pages 683-702, October.
  14. Zhu, Min, 2014. "College admissions in China: A mechanism design perspective," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 618-631.
  15. John William Hatfield & Fuhito Kojima & Yusuke Narita, 2011. "Promoting School Competition Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach," Working Papers 2011-018, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
  16. Carvalho, José-Raimundo & Magnac, Thierry & Xiong, Qizhou, 2014. "College Choice Allocation Mechanisms: Structural Estimates and Counterfactuals," TSE Working Papers 14-506, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  17. Fuhito Kojima & M. Ünver, 2014. "The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 515-544, April.
  18. Fuhito Kojima & M. Utku Ünver, 2010. "The 'Boston' School-Choice Mechanism," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 729, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 08 Oct 2010.
  19. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1954-1978, December.
  20. Umut M. Dur & Scott Duke Kominers & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "The Demise of Walk Zones in Boston: Priorities vs. Precedence in School Choice," NBER Working Papers 18981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Jaimie W. Lien & Jie Zheng & Xiaohan Zhong, 2016. "Preference submission timing in school choice matching: testing fairness and efficiency in the laboratory," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 19(1), pages 116-150, March.
  22. Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the ROTC Branching Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(1), pages 186-219.
  23. Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kesten, Onur, 2014. "The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2014-210, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  24. Hatfield, John William & Kojima, Fuhito & Narita, Yusuke, 2016. "Improving schools through school choice: A market design approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 186-211.
  25. Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 608-627, June.
  26. Yenmez, M. Bumin & Yildirim, Muhammed Ali & Hafalir, Isa Emin, 2013. "Effective affirmative action in school choice," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
  27. Flip Klijn & Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz, 2016. "Static versus Dynamic Deferred Acceptance in School Choice: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers 926, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  28. Akahoshi, Takashi, 2014. "Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 7-13.
  29. Bando, Keisuke, 2014. "On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 269-287.
  30. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match," NBER Working Papers 14864, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  31. Kóczy Á., László, 2010. "A magyarországi felvételi rendszerek sajátosságai
    [Specific features of Hungarys system of school and university admissions]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 142-164.
  32. Carroll, Gabriel, 2010. "An efficiency theorem for incompletely known preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2463-2470, November.
  33. Kesten, Onur & Ünver, M. Utku, 2015. "A theory of school choice lotteries," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
  34. Kumano, Taro & Watabe, Masahiro, 2012. "Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 428-434.
  35. Kumano, Taro, 2013. "Strategy-proofness and stability of the Boston mechanism: An almost impossibility result," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 23-29.
  36. John William Hatfield & Fuhito Kojima & Yusuke Narita, 2012. "Promoting School Competition Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach," Discussion Papers 12-036, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  37. Marilda Sotomayor, 2012. "A further note on the college admission game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(1), pages 179-193, February.
  38. Fuhito Kojima, 2008. "Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(3), pages 357-365, October.
  39. Tayfun Sonmez & Parag Pathak (MIT), 2011. "Admissions Reform at Chicago's Selective High Schools: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation," EcoMod2011 2954, EcoMod.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.