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Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted

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  • Marutani, Kyohei

Abstract

We consider school choice problems where students may submit only restricted length of preference lists. We propose an acyclicity condition for the priority structure of schools. When schools’ priorities are substitutable, we show that a Pareto efficient and stable assignment rule is Nash implementable by the deferred acceptance mechanism if and only if schools’ priority structures are acyclic in our sense.

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  • Marutani, Kyohei, 2018. "Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 153-158.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:93:y:2018:i:c:p:153-158
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.03.007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1403-1434, November.
    2. Caterina Calsamiglia & Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn, 2010. "Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1860-1874, September.
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    7. Kumano, Taro, 2013. "Strategy-proofness and stability of the Boston mechanism: An almost impossibility result," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 23-29.
    8. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
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    10. Haeringer, Guillaume & Klijn, Flip, 2009. "Constrained school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1921-1947, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2018. "Centralized Course Allocation," UC3M Working papers. Economics 27388, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

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