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School choice with farsighted students

Author

Listed:
  • Atay, Ata

    (University of Barcelona)

  • Mauleon, Ana

    (Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium)

  • Vannetelbosch, Vincent

    (Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium)

Abstract

We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already sufficient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC. In addition, we show that variations of TTC that improve in terms of no justified envy are farsightedly stable, but may require more farsightedness on behalf of students.

Suggested Citation

  • Atay, Ata & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2025. "School choice with farsighted students," LIDAM Reprints CORE 3319, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:3319
    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.010
    Note: In: Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, vol. 149, p. 148-163
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    Cited by:

    1. Ata Atay & Sylvain Funck & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2025. "Matching markets with farsighted couples," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 64(3), pages 465-481, May.
    2. Ata Atay & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2025. "Limited Farsightedness in Priority‐Based Matching," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 27(4), August.
    3. Atay, Ata & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2025. "School choice with farsighted students," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 148-163.
    4. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2025. "Do stable outcomes survive in marriage problems with myopic and farsighted players?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 322(2), pages 713-724.
    5. Yao Cheng & Di Feng, 2025. "On fairness of multi-center allocation problems," Papers 2509.21812, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2026.
    6. Clayton Thomas, 2024. "Characterization of Priority-Neutral Matching Lattices," Papers 2404.02142, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2025.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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