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Citations for "Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design"

by Peter M. DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer & Andrzej Skrzypacz

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  1. Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, 2008. "Strategic judgment proofing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 926-948.
  2. Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2012. "Smart Buyers," FMG Discussion Papers dp696, Financial Markets Group.
  3. Roman Inderst & Holger M. Mueller, 2006. "Informed Lending and Security Design," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(5), pages 2137-2162, October.
  4. Pablo F. Beker & Ángel Hernando-Veciana, 2011. "Persistent markups in bidding markets with financial constraints," Economics Working Papers we1133, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  5. Inderst, Roman & Vladimirov, Vladimir, 2014. "Preserving "Debt Capacity" or "Equity Capacity": A Dynamic Theory of Security Design under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 9923, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2012. "Security bid auctions for agency contracts," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 371, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  7. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo & S. Viswanathan, 2004. "Merger Mechanisms," Working Papers 2004.7, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  8. Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2012. "Procurement with Unenforceable Contract Time and the Law of Liquidated Damages," Working Papers 2012.45, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  9. Aktas, Nihat & de Bodt, Eric & Roll, Richard, 2009. "Learning, hubris and corporate serial acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 543-561, December.
  10. Mehmet Ekmekci & Nenad Kos & Rakesh Vohra, 2013. "Just Enough or All: Selling a Firm," Working Papers 470, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  11. Abhishek, Vineet & Hajek, Bruce & Williams, Steven R., 2013. "Auctions with a profit sharing contract," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 247-270.
  12. Eckbo, B. Espen, 2009. "Bidding strategies and takeover premiums: A review," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 149-178, February.
  13. Aktas, Nihat & de Bodt, Eric & Roll, Richard, 2011. "Serial acquirer bidding: An empirical test of the learning hypothesis," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, February.
  14. repec:dgr:uvatin:20140139 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Thomas Borek & Stefan Bühler & Armin Schmutzler, 2008. "Analyzing Mergers under Asymmetric Information: A Simple Reduced-Form Approach," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2008 2008-15, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
  16. Ding, Wei & Fan, Cuihong & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2013. "Horizontal mergers with synergies: Cash vs. profit-share auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 382-391.
  17. Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2013. "Auctions with contingent payments — An overview," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 666-675.
  18. Hege, Ulrich & Lovo, Stefano & Slovin, Myron & Sushka, Marie, 2006. "Equity and cash in intercorporate asset sales : theory and evidence," Les Cahiers de Recherche 859, HEC Paris.
  19. Andrey Malenko & Alexander Gorbenko, 2013. "Means of payment and timing of mergers and acquisitions in a dynamic economy," 2013 Meeting Papers 928, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  20. Koufopoulos, Kostos & Kozhan, Roman & Trigilia, Giulio, 2014. "Optimal Security Design under Asymmetric Information and Profit Manipulation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1050, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.