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Implementation With Contingent Contracts

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  • Rahul Deb
  • Debasis Mishra

Abstract

We study dominant strategy incentive compatibility in a mechanism design setting with contingent contracts where the payoff of each agent is observed by the principal and can be contracted upon. Our main focus is on the class of linear contracts (one of the most commonly used contingent contracts) which consist of a transfer and a flat rate of profit sharing. We characterize outcomes implementable by linear contracts and provide a foundation for them by showing that, in finite type spaces, every social choice function that can be implemented using a more general nonlinear contingent contract can also be implemented using a linear contract. We then qualitatively describe the set of implementable outcomes. We show that a general class of social welfare criteria can be implemented. This class contains social choice functions (such as the Rawlsian) which cannot be implemented using (uncontingent) transfers. Under additional conditions, we show that only social choice functions in this class are implementable.

Suggested Citation

  • Rahul Deb & Debasis Mishra, 2014. "Implementation With Contingent Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82, pages 2371-2393, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:82:y:2014:i::p:2371-2393
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    Cited by:

    1. Tingjun Liu & Dan Bernhardt, 2021. "Rent Extraction with Securities Plus Cash," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(4), pages 1869-1912, August.
    2. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(4), pages 575-585, December.
    3. Pan, Lijun & Wang, Dazhong, 2021. "The broker-optimal bilateral trading mechanisms with linear contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    4. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2015. "Implementation, Verification, and Detection," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-991, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    5. Liu, Tingjun & Bernhardt, Dan, 2019. "Optimal equity auctions with two-dimensional types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    6. Yoon, Kiho, 2020. "Implementability with contingent contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    7. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2017. "Dynamic Implementation, Verification, and Detection," CARF F-Series CARF-F-416, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    8. Wong, Tak-Yuen & Wong, Ho-Po Crystal, 2023. "Securities auctions with pre-project information management," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    9. Pawe{l} Dziewulski & Joshua Lanier & John K. -H. Quah, 2024. "Revealed preference and revealed preference cycles: a survey," Papers 2405.08459, arXiv.org.
    10. Parikshit De & Manipushpak Mitra, 2017. "Incentives and justice for sequencing problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(2), pages 239-264, August.
    11. Yingkai Li & Jonathan Libgober, 2023. "Incentivizing Forecasters to Learn: Summarized vs. Unrestricted Advice," Papers 2310.19147, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2025.
    12. Liu, Heng, 2018. "Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
    13. Dziewulski, Paweł & Lanier, Joshua & Quah, John K.-H., 2024. "Revealed preference and revealed preference cycles: A survey," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).

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