When do groups perform better than individuals? A company takeover experiment
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- M. Casari & J. Zhang & C. Jackson, 2011. "When Do Groups Perform Better than Individuals? A Company Takeover Experiment," Working Papers wp763, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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More about this item
KeywordsWinner’s curse; takeover game; group decision making; communication; experiments;
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-09-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-09-25 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2010-09-25 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2010-09-25 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2010-09-25 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2010-09-25 (Microeconomics)
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