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Predating Predators: An experimental Study

Author

Listed:
  • Judith Avrahami

    (The Goldie Rotman Center for Cognitive Science and Education, and The Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel)

  • Yaakov Kareev

    (The Goldie Rotman Center for Cognitive Science and Education, and The Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel)

  • Werner G³th

    (Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Unit, Jena, Germany)

Abstract

The phenomenon of predating predators requires at least three specimens to whom we refer as players 1, 2, and 3. Player 1 has simply to guess nature when trying to find food. Player 2 is hunting player 1 in the hope that 1 is well fed but must also avoid being hunted by player 3. One major motivation is to test three benchmark solutions (uniformly perfect, impulse balance and payoff balance equilibrium) in such a complex strategic setting. In the experiment three participants repeatedly pay the game (partner design) which allows us to test whether certain types of behavior are just inclinations or stable patterns which survive leaning and experience

Suggested Citation

  • Judith Avrahami & Yaakov Kareev & Werner G³th, 2001. "Predating Predators: An experimental Study," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 18, pages 337-351.
  • Handle: RePEc:hom:homoec:v:18:y:2001:p:337-351
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Reinhard Selten & Klaus Abbink & Ricarda Cox, 2005. "Learning Direction Theory and the Winner’s Curse," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 8(1), pages 5-20, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dennis A. V. Dittrich & Werner Güth & Martin G. Kocher & Paul Pezanis‐Christou, 2012. "Loss Aversion and Learning to Bid," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 79(314), pages 226-257, April.

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