Intrafirm conflicts and interfirm competition
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More about this item
Keywordsagency theory; strategic interfirm competition; revenue sharing;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-08-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-08-09 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2011-08-09 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2011-08-09 (Game Theory)
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