The role of managerial work in market performance: A monopoly model with team production
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- Hildenbrand, Andreas & Duran, Mihael, 2014. "The Role of Managerial Work in Market Performance: A Monopoly Model with Team Production," MPRA Paper 58594, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Andreas Hildenbrand & Mihael Duran, 2013. "The Role of Managerial Work in Market Performance: A Monopoly Model with Team Production," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201353, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
References listed on IDEAS
- Max Albert & Andreas Hildenbrand, 2012. "Industrial organization in the laboratory," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201205, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Werner Güth & Kerstin Pull & Manfred Stadler, 2009.
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More about this item
Keywordsfirm organization; market structure; property rights;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-02-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2014-02-02 (Business Economics)
- NEP-HRM-2014-02-02 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
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