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Non-Standard Monetary Policy Measures – Magic Wand or Tiger by the Tail?

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  • Belke, Ansgar

Abstract

This paper briefly assesses the effectiveness of the different non-standard monetary policy tools in the Euro Area. Its main focus is on the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) Programme which is praised by some as the ECB's 'magic wand'. Moreover, it discloses further possible unintended consequences of these measures in the current context of weak economic activity and subdued growth going forward. For this purpose, it investigates specific risks for price stability and asset price developments in the first main part of the paper. It is not a too remote issue that the Fed does have a 'tiger by the tail', as Hayek (2009) expressed it, i.e. that the bank will finally have to accept either a recession or inflation and that there is no choice in between. Furthermore, it checks on whether the OMT programme really does not impose costs onto the taxpayer. Finally, it comes up with some policy implications from differences in money and credit growth in different individual countries of the Euro Area. The second main part of the paper assesses which other tools the ECB could use in order to stimulate the economy in the Euro Area. It does so by delivering details on whether and how the effectiveness of the ECB's policies can be improved through more transparency and 'forward guidance'.

Suggested Citation

  • Belke, Ansgar, 2013. "Non-Standard Monetary Policy Measures – Magic Wand or Tiger by the Tail?," Ruhr Economic Papers 447, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:rwirep:447
    DOI: 10.4419/86788504
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2009. "Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(6), pages 2201-2238, June.
    2. De Grauwe, Paul & Ji, Yuemei, 2013. "Self-fulfilling crises in the Eurozone: An empirical test," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 15-36.
    3. Falagiarda, Matteo & Reitz, Stefan, 2013. "Announcements of ECB unconventional programs: Implications for the sovereign risk of Italy," Kiel Working Papers 1866, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    4. Ansgar Belke, 2010. "Driven by the markets? ECB sovereign bond purchases and the securities markets programme," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 45(6), pages 357-363, November.
    5. Ansgar Belke & Barbara Schnurbein, 2012. "European monetary policy and the ECB rotation model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 289-323, April.
    6. Sven Steinkamp & Frank Westermann, 2012. "On Creditor Seniority and Sovereign Bond Prices in Europe," CESifo Working Paper Series 3944, CESifo.
    7. M. Middeldorp, 2011. "Central Bank Transparency, the Accuracy of Professional Forecasts, and Interest Rate Volatility," Working Papers 11-12, Utrecht School of Economics.
    8. Clemens J. M. Kool & Daniel L. Thornton, 2015. "How Effective Is Central Bank Forward Guidance?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 97(4), pages 303-322.
    9. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2013. "The Responsibility of States and Central Banks in the Euro Crisis," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 66(1), pages 03-33, June.
    10. Gros, Daniel, 2012. "A simple model of multiple equilibria and sovereign default," CEPS Papers 7174, Centre for European Policy Studies.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michele Chang & Patrick Leblond, 2015. "All in: Market expectations of eurozone integrity in the sovereign debt crisis," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(3), pages 626-655, June.
    2. Stephanos Papadamou & Eleftherios Spyromitros & Nikolaos A. Kyriazis, 2018. "Quantitative easing effects on commercial bank liability and government yields in UK: A threshold cointegration approach," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 353-371, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central bank transparency; euro area; forward guidance; non-standard monetary policies; outright monetary transactions; quantitative easing; segmentation of credit markets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements

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