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Corporate Ownership and Control in Victorian Britain

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Listed author(s):
  • Acheson, Graeme
  • Campbell, Gareth
  • Turner, John D.
  • Vanteeva, Nadia

Abstract

Using ownership and control data for 890 firm-years, this paper examines the concentration of capital and voting rights in British companies in the second half of the nineteenth century. We find that both capital and voting rights were diffuse by modern-day standards. This implies that ownership was separated from control in the UK much earlier than previously thought, and given that it occurred in an era with weak shareholder protection law, it undermines the influential law and finance hypothesis. We also find that diffuse ownership is correlated with large boards, a London head office, non-linear voting rights, and shares traded on multiple markets.

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Paper provided by Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University Centre for Economic History in its series QUCEH Working Paper Series with number 14-01.

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Date of creation: 2014
Handle: RePEc:zbw:qucehw:1401
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Keywords: Corporate ownership and control; Law and finance hypothesis; British financial history; Shareholder protection law;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
  • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
  • N24 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: 1913-

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Cited by:

  1. Ingrid Henriksen & Eoin McLaughlin & Paul Sharp, 2015. "Contracts and cooperation: the relative failure of the Irish dairy industry in the late nineteenth century reconsidered," European Review of Economic History, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(4), pages 412-431.
  2. Eric Hilt, 2014. "History of American Corporate Governance: Law, Institutions, and Politics," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 1-21, December.
  3. Acheson, Graeme G. & Coyle, Christopher & Turner, John D., 2015. "Happy hour followed by hangover: Financing the UK brewery industry, 1880-1913," QUCEH Working Paper Series 15-01, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University Centre for Economic History.
  4. Campbell, Gareth & Quinn, William & Turner, John D. & Ye, Qing, 2015. "What moved share prices in the nineteenth-century London stock market?," QUCEH Working Paper Series 15-06, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University Centre for Economic History.
  5. Eric Hilt, 2014. "Corporate Governance and the Development of Manufacturing Enterprises in Nineteenth-Century Massachusetts," NBER Chapters,in: Enterprising America: Businesses, Banks, and Credit Markets in Historical Perspective, pages 73-102 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Acheson, Graeme G. & Campbell, Gareth & Turner, John D., 2016. "Common law and the origin of shareholder protection," eabh Papers 16-03, The European Association for Banking and Financial History (EABH).
  7. Turner, John D., 2017. "The development of English company law before 1900," QUCEH Working Paper Series 2017-01, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University Centre for Economic History.
  8. Turner, John D. & Ye, Qing & Walker, Clive B., 2016. "Media coverage and stock returns on the London Stock Exchange, 1825-70," QUCEH Working Paper Series 2016-02, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University Centre for Economic History.

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