When trust fades...: Can optimal mechanisms for policy decisions always be designed?
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More about this item
Keywordsmechanism design; incentive theory; adverse selection; moral hazard; Bayesian games;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-01-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2014-01-10 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2014-01-10 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2014-01-10 (Microeconomics)
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