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The role of the IMF in the European debt crisis

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  • Seitz, Franz
  • Jost, Thomas

Abstract

This paper gives an overview of the role of the IMF in the European debt crisis. It describes the rescue packages and the involvement of the IMF. The main part discusses the pros and cons of the participation of the IMF in elaborating and monitoring the economic adjustment programs for the countries in crisis. A last section concludes and tries to answer the question whether the Troika model might be suited to solve future international crises.

Suggested Citation

  • Seitz, Franz & Jost, Thomas, 2012. "The role of the IMF in the European debt crisis," Weidener Diskussionspapiere 32, University of Applied Sciences Amberg-Weiden (OTH).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:hawdps:32
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/56452/1/689266685.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eduardo Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, 2009. "The Costs of Sovereign Default," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 56(4), pages 683-741, November.
    2. Barry Eichengreen, 2007. "A Blueprint for IMF Reform: More than just a Lender," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 153-175, July.
    3. Clemens Fuest, 2011. "Will the Reform of the Institutional Framework Restore Fiscal Stability in the Eurozone?," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(02), pages 34-39, July.
    4. Furceri, Davide & Zdzienicka, Aleksandra, 2012. "How costly are debt crises?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 726-742.
    5. Carmen M. Reinhart & M. Belen Sbrancia1, 2015. "The liquidation of government debt," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 30(82), pages 291-333.
    6. Onno Beaufort Wijnholds, 2011. "Fighting Financial Fires," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-0-230-35420-3, December.
    7. Carlo Cottarelli & Paolo Mauro & Lorenzo Forni & Jan Gottschalk, 2010. "Default in Today's Advanced Economies; Unnecessary, Undesirable, and Unlikely," IMF Staff Position Notes 2010/12, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Mr. Carlo Cottarelli & Mr. Paolo Mauro & Lorenzo Forni & Jan Gottschalk, 2010. "Default in Today's Advanced Economies: Unnecessary, Undesirable, and Unlikely," IMF Staff Position Notes 2010/012, International Monetary Fund.
    9. C. Randall Henning, 2011. "Coordinating Regional and Multilateral Financial Institutions," Working Paper Series WP11-9, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Corsetti, G. & Erce, A. & Uy, T., 2017. "Official Sector Lending Strategies During the Euro Area Crisis," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1730, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Eichengreen, Barry & Jung, Naeun & Moch, Stephen & Mody, Ashoka, 2014. "The Eurozone Crisis: Phoenix Miracle or Lost Decade?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 39(PB), pages 288-308.
    3. Jost, Thomas & Seitz, Franz, 2021. "Designing a European Monetary Fund: What role for the IMF?," IMFS Working Paper Series 151, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    4. Cui, Wei, 2017. "Macroeconomic effects of delayed capital liquidation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86156, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    IMF; Europe; debt; euro;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • F59 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Other

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