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Did sanctions help Putin?

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  • Peeva, Aleksandra

Abstract

Do sanctions strengthen the targeted regime? I analyze the 2014 imposition of Western sanctions on Russia and its impact on voting. The US and the EU introduced targeted measures against Russian entities and individuals related to Putin's regime. Using polling station-level data I investigate whether Putin gained relatively more support among those local constituencies which were geographically close to a sanctioned firm. I find a significant effect of targeted sanction imposition on the vote share in presidential elections between 2012 and 2018. Putin gained 1.54 percentage points at those polling stations that had a sanctioned firm in immediate vicinity. Targeted sanctions imposition also affected voter turnout. The effect on voting can be explained as rally-around-the-flag in the face of sanctions, as long as voters did not endure economic losses through a decline in some sanctioned firms' economic performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Peeva, Aleksandra, 2019. "Did sanctions help Putin?," Discussion Papers 2019/7, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:20197
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    Cited by:

    1. Harrison, Mark, 2020. "Economic Warfare in Twentieth-Century History and Strategy," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 468, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    2. Thiemo Fetzer & Carlo Schwarz, 2021. "Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump’s Trade Wars," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(636), pages 1717-1741.
    3. Barseghyan, Gayane, 2019. "Sanctions and counter-sanctions : What did they do?," BOFIT Discussion Papers 24/2019, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    4. repec:zbw:bofitp:2019_024 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    sanctions; rally-around-the-flag; voting; Russia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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