IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/cbscwp/342526.html

Governing through division

Author

Listed:
  • Invernizzi, Giovanna M.
  • Trombetta, Federico

Abstract

We develop a model of partisan factions within an accountability framework. The incumbent leader can implement reforms but faces an internal faction that may undermine reform effectiveness through dissent. Unlike the faction, the leader's preferences align with those of the voter. Dissent reveals information to the voter about the leader's strength, sometimes inducing over-reform-strong leaders reform even when they should not. Moderate factional strength enhances voter welfare by balancing reform effectiveness and policy accuracy. Active dissent can improve welfare relative to strategic silence, and strong leaders may benefit more from dissent than from silence.

Suggested Citation

  • Invernizzi, Giovanna M. & Trombetta, Federico, 2026. "Governing through division," Working Papers 385, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cbscwp:342526
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/342526/1/1974700321.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • P00 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:cbscwp:342526. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/gsuchus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.