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When the light shines too much: Rational inattention and pandering

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  • Federico Trombetta

Abstract

Should voters always pay attention to politics? I explore the role of endogenous costly attention allocation in politics, combining insights from the growing literature on rational inattention with a standard model of political agency. I show that when attention to the action of the politician is endogenous, voters may choose to pay too much attention in equilibrium, and this induces too much political pandering. Moreover when attention to the action and to the state of the world are both endogenous, voters may not pay enough attention the state with respect to the ex ante optimum. A reduction in the total cost of attention does not correct this inefficiency and can even reduce welfare. This model can be a demand‐driven explanation of the under‐provision of analytical contents by news channels.

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  • Federico Trombetta, 2020. "When the light shines too much: Rational inattention and pandering," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(1), pages 98-145, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:22:y:2020:i:1:p:98-145
    DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12402
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    Cited by:

    1. Anqi Li & Lin Hu, 2020. "Electoral Accountability and Selection with Personalized Information Aggregation," Papers 2009.03761, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    2. Li, Anqi & Hu, Lin, 2023. "Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 296-315.
    3. Simon Lodato & Christos Mavridis & Federico Vaccari, 2024. "The Unelected Hand? Bureaucratic Influence and Electoral Accountability," Papers 2402.17526, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
    4. Merzoni, Guido & Trombetta, Federico, 2022. "Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 132-143.
    5. Devdariani, Saba & Hirsch, Alexander V., 2023. "Voter attention and electoral accountability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
    6. Ian Ball & James Bono & Justin Grana & Nicole Immorlica & Brendan Lucier & Aleksandrs Slivkins, 2022. "Content Filtering with Inattentive Information Consumers," Papers 2205.14060, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
    7. Bracco, Emanuele & Liberini, Federica & Lockwood, Ben & Porcelli, Francesco & Redoano, Michela & Sgroi, Daniel, 2021. "The Effects of Social Capital on Government Performance and Turnover : Theory and Evidence from Italian Municipalities," QAPEC Discussion Papers 04, Quantitative and Analytical Political Economy Research Centre.

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