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Informative Cheap Talk in Elections

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  • Richard van Weelden

Abstract

Why do office-motivated politicians sometimes espouse views that are non-congruentwith their electorate’s? Can non-congruent statements convey any information about whata politician will do if elected, and if so, why would voters elect a politician who makessuch statements? Furthermore, can electoral campaigns also directly affect an elected official’sbehavior? We develop a model of credible “cheap talk†—costless and non-bindingcommunication—in elections. The foundation is an endogenous voter preference for apolitician who is known to be non-congruent over one whose congruence is sufficientlyuncertain. This preference arises because uncertainty about an elected official’s policypreferences generates policymaking distortions due to reputation/career concerns. Weshow that cheap talk can alter the electorate’s beliefs about a politician’s policy preferencesand thereby affect the elected official’s behavior. Informative cheap talk can increaseor decrease voter welfare, with a greater scope for welfare benefits when reputation concernsare more important.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard van Weelden, 2017. "Informative Cheap Talk in Elections," Working Paper 6328, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    • Handle: RePEc:pit:wpaper:6328
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    Cited by:

    1. Archishman Chakraborty & Parikshit Ghosh & Jaideep Roy, 2020. "Expert-Captured Democracies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(6), pages 1713-1751, June.
    2. Stephane Wolton, 2019. "Are Biased Media Bad for Democracy?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(3), pages 548-562, July.
    3. Alp Atakan & Levent Kockesen & Elif Kubilay, 2017. "Optimal Delegation of Sequential Decisions: The Role of Communication and Reputation," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1701, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    4. Kishishita, Daiki & Yamagishi, Atsushi, 2021. "Contagion of populist extremism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    5. Georgy Egorov, 2015. "Single-Issue Campaigns and Multidimensional Politics," NBER Working Papers 21265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Atakan, Alp & Koçkesen, Levent & Kubilay, Elif, 2020. "Starting small to communicate," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 265-296.
    7. Bruno Salcedo, 2019. "Persuading part of an audience," Papers 1903.00129, arXiv.org.
    8. Satoshi Kasamatsu & Daiki Kishishita, 2021. "Tax competition and political agency problems," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(4), pages 1782-1810, November.
    9. Yuan Liu & Hongmin Chen, 2022. "Cheap‐talk advertising, product experience, and reputation concern," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(7), pages 3165-3175, October.
    10. Mezzetti, Claudio, 2020. "Manipulative Disclosure," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1250, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    11. Merzoni, Guido & Trombetta, Federico, 2022. "Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 132-143.
    12. Satoshi Kasamatsu & Daiki Kishishita, 2020. "Collective Reputation and Learning in Political Agency Problems," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1110, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    13. Lindsey Gailmard, 2022. "Electoral accountability and political competence," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(2), pages 236-261, April.
    14. Francisco Rodríguez & Eduardo Zambrano, 2022. "Monotone comparative statics in the Calvert–Wittman model," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(1), pages 105-116, May.
    15. Woon, Jonathan & Kanthak, Kristin, 2019. "Elections, ability, and candidate honesty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 735-753.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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