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Trust dynamics in electoral competition

Author

Listed:
  • Glynia, Nektaria
  • Manalis, Georgios
  • Xefteris, Dimitrios

Abstract

We study the fragility of trust between voters and politicians, exploring the likelihood of trust recovery following disruptions. We identify a critical trust threshold: above it, the trust dynamics converge to a stable steady state marked by politicians’ moderate deception and voters’ tempered expectations; below it, trust gradually declines, giving way to deepening scepticism. These insights highlight that while stable levels of trust are feasible, they should not be taken for granted, contributing to the discussion on the underpinnings of recent trust crises across European democracies.

Suggested Citation

  • Glynia, Nektaria & Manalis, Georgios & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2025. "Trust dynamics in electoral competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:179:y:2025:i:c:s0014292125001758
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105125
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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