Factions and Political Competition
This paper presents a new model of political competition where candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. Several key theoretical predictions of the model find a counterpart in our empirical analysis of newly coded data on the provision of water services in Mexico.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Persico, Nicola, José C. R. Pueblita and Dan Silverman. “Factions and Political Competition." Journal of Political Economy 119, 2 (April 2011): 242-288.|
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- Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-78, August.
- L. Wade, 1988. "Review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 99-100, July.
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