Factions and Political Competition
This paper presents a new model of political competition where candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. Several key theoretical predictions of the model find a counterpart in our empirical analysis of newly coded data on the provision of water services in Mexico.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2007|
|Publication status:||published as Persico, Nicola, José C. R. Pueblita and Dan Silverman. “Factions and Political Competition." Journal of Political Economy 119, 2 (April 2011): 242-288.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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