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Free-Riding in Pharmaceutical Price Regulation: Theory and Evidence

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  • Paolo Pertile
  • Simona Gamba
  • Martin Forster

Abstract

We present a model of the strategic interaction among authorities regulating pharmaceutical prices in different countries and the R&D investment decisions of pharmaceutical firms. Regulators’ decisions affect consumer surplus directly, via prices, and indirectly via firms’ profits and R&D investment policies, which in turn affect patient health. The positive externality of a price increase in one country provides an incentive for other countries to free-ride, and we show how country-level characteristics affect optimal pricing decisions and equilibria. Our theoretical predictions are tested using price data for a set of 70 cancer drugs in 25 OECD countries. We find evidence of behaviour that is consistent with the free-riding hypothesis and which, in line with the theoretical predictions, differs according to country-level characteristics. Countries with comparatively large market shares tend to react to increases in other countries’ prices by lowering their own prices; in countries with comparatively small market shares, regulators’ decisions are consistent with the objective of introducing the product at as low a price as possible. We discuss the policy implications of our results for incentivising global pharmaceutical R&D and the recent proposal to move towards a joint pharmaceutical procurement process at the European level.

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  • Paolo Pertile & Simona Gamba & Martin Forster, 2018. "Free-Riding in Pharmaceutical Price Regulation: Theory and Evidence," Discussion Papers 18/04, Department of Economics, University of York.
    • Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:18/04
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    Cited by:

    1. Gamba, S.; & Pertile, P.; & Righetti, G.;, 2022. "Spillovers of Pharmaceutical Price Regulations: evidence from the AMNOG Reform in Germany," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 22/20, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
    2. Kyle, Margaret K., 2022. "Incentives for pharmaceutical innovation: What’s working, what’s lacking," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy

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