Assessing excess profits from different entry regulations
Entry regulations affecting professional services such as pharmacies are common practice in many European countries. We assess the impact of entry regulations on profits estimating a structural model of entry using the information provided by a policy experiment. We use the case of different regional policies governing the opening of new pharmacies in Spain to show that structural models of entry ought to be estimated with data from policy experiments to pin down how entry regulations change payoffs functions of the incumbents. Contrary to the public interest rationales, regulations are not boosting only small town pharmacies payoffs nor increasing all pharmacies payoffs alike. The gains from regulations are very unevenly distributed,suggesting that private interests are shaping the current mix of entry and markup regulations.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2009|
|Date of revision:||Apr 2009|
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- Griffith, Rachel & Harmgart, Heike, 2008. "Supermarkets and Planning Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6713, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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