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Fixed wage or share: Contingent contract renewal and skipper motivation

Author

Listed:
  • Thorolfur Matthiasson

Abstract

Fishermen around the world are usually remunerated by shares. Iceland is no exception in that respect. The fixed wage systems,that have been tried out, have been short- lived and their utilization limited. The fundamental question asked in this paper is: Why do almost all vessel owners use the same remuneration principles? The answer offered is that the circumstances under which fishing is conducted play a vital role here. Surveillance of the conduct of employees is almost impossible. Hence, vessel owners must develop some system for motivating workers and to discourage shirking. It is shown that sharing is better than alternative forms of remuneration in that respect. The production unit is a small platform that is not easily abandoned during a trip. The product ofr a given trip is well- defined. All of these factors help to explain the prevalence of sharing in fisheries.

Suggested Citation

  • Thorolfur Matthiasson, 1997. "Fixed wage or share: Contingent contract renewal and skipper motivation," Labor and Demography 9702002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpla:9702002
    Note: Type of Document - Acrobat file; prepared on WordPerfect 3.5 for the Mac; to print on Apple LaserWriter; pages: 42 4; figures: included
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/lab/papers/9702/9702002.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sugato Bhattacharyya & Francine Lafontaine, 1995. "Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 761-781, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nguyen, Quang & Leung, PingSun, 2009. "Choice of Remuneration Regime in Fisheries: The Case of Hawaii’s Longline Fisheries," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 34(3), pages 1-20, December.
    2. Alvin Slewion Jueseah & Dadi Mar Kristofersson & Tumi Tómasson & Ogmundur Knutsson, 2020. "A Bio-Economic Analysis of the Liberian Coastal Fisheries," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(23), pages 1-21, November.
    3. Matthiasson, Thorolfur, 1999. "Cost sharing and catch sharing," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 25-44, February.
    4. Jordi Guillen & Claire Macher & Mathieu Merzéréaud & Jean Boncoeur & Olivier Guyader, 2015. "Effects of the Share Remuneration System on Fisheries Management Targets and Rent Distribution," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 123-138.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D33 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Factor Income Distribution
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • L79 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Other
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery

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