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Modelli di Agenzie di Sviluppo Regionale: Analisi Teorica ed Evidenza Empirica

Author

Listed:
  • Marco Arnone

    (IMF & Catholic University of Milan)

  • Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini

    (Catholic University of Milan)

  • Franco Timpano

    (Catholic University of Milan)

Abstract

Questo lavoro intende affrontare la questione degli assetti istituzionali e delle modalità organizzative dell’intervento dello Stato a favore dello sviluppo territoriale. Il tema è di crescente interesse in considerazione del moltiplicarsi dei livelli di governo (sovranazionale, nazionale, regionale e sub-regionale) che si occupano di sviluppo territoriale, ma anche in considerazione della complessità degli interventi. In termini di efficacia, i risultati di una politica territoriale dipendono strettamente dall’assetto delle relazioni tra i soggetti coinvolti nell’attività di sviluppo. Ciò riguarda sia gli aspetti di carattere istituzionale, che le diverse configurazioni dei rapporti di agenzia che possono emergere tra di essi. Il lavoro affronta la questione dell’utilizzo di incentivi ottenuti dalle imprese, riconosciuti dallo Stato e gestiti attraverso Agenzie intermedie.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Arnone & Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini & Franco Timpano, 2004. "Modelli di Agenzie di Sviluppo Regionale: Analisi Teorica ed Evidenza Empirica," Development and Comp Systems 0404004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:0404004
    Note: Type of Document - doc; pages: 19. This paper deals with the insitutional and organizatinal structure of state intervention in local development
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 2008. "Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," RAE - Revista de Administração de Empresas, FGV-EAESP Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo (Brazil), vol. 48(2), April.
    2. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    3. Marco Arnone & Franco Timpano, 2004. "Struttura Industriale e Impatto degli Incentivi: un'Analisi Empirica della Legge 488/1992," Urban/Regional 0404005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Fadrique de Vargas Machuca & Vito Marcolongo & Tommaso Stefani & Marco Arnone, 1999. "Il Mezzogiorno visto dall'esterno: un'indagine diretta sulle maggiori imprese," L'industria, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 235-250.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Giuseppina Malerba & Marta Spreafico, 2013. "Income inequality in the European Union: evidence from a panel analysis," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Politica Economica ispe0065, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    3. John S L McCombie & Marta Spreafico, 2013. "Can only democracies enhance “Human Development”? Evidence from the Former Soviet Countries," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Politica Economica ispe0066, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    4. Giuseppina Malerba & Marta Spreafico, 2014. "The rich and the poor in the EU and the Great Recession: Evidence from a Panel Analysis," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Politica Economica ispe0068, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    5. Luigi Pierfranco Campiglio, 2013. "Why Italy's saving rate became (so) low?," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Politica Economica ispe0063, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    6. Campiglio, Luigi Pierfranco, 2014. "Unbundling the Great European Recession (2009-2013): Unemployment, Consumption, Investment, Inflation and Current Account," MPRA Paper 53002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Luigi Pierfranco Campiglio, 2012. "Market's SINS and the European Welfare State: theory and empirical evidences," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Politica Economica ispe0060, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    8. Marta Spreafico, 2013. "Institutions, the resource curse and the transition economies: further evidence," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Politica Economica ispe0064, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).

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    JEL classification:

    • O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth
    • P - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems

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