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Crowding Out and Banking Crises

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  • Hernando Kaminsky, Pablo Daniel

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of government issuance on firm issuance during banking crises using transaction-level bond and loan data from 66 countries between 1991 and 2017. Governments rarely issue loans, preferring to issue in bond markets. In contrast, firms receive most of their financing from banks. During banking crises, as the supply of domestic loans decreases, firms switch to issuing bonds in domestic markets. The paper uses a novel instrument based on maturing debt to overcome the potential endogeneity of government issuance. The findings show that firms must compete with the government for funds in the domestic bond market and are crowded out from this market as a result. This happens not only in developing countries, but in advanced countries as well. The paper also shows that firms with the ability to tap international debt markets switch to these markets when crowding out occurs in domestic bond markets. Lastly, the paper shows that more developed domestic bond markets mitigate, but do not eliminate, the degree to which crowding out occurs.

Suggested Citation

  • Hernando Kaminsky, Pablo Daniel, 2025. "Crowding Out and Banking Crises," Policy Research Working Paper Series 11145, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:11145
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    References listed on IDEAS

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